factivity of djuno

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la xod believes that he can djuno a falsehood, and he believes that he has shown that he can, but I'm fairly sure he can't and hasn't. --xorxes

  • That's based on the fact that the le velju'o is a belief system, not necessarily Absolute Truth. Belief systems make all sorts of claims, some provably false and others unprovable at all, from the perspective of a strict, materialistic, empirical le velju'o which I (and probably you) personally subscribe to. --la xod
    • Then the problem is that you're mixing different velju'o/seljitfa in the same sentence. You can't djuno something that is a falsehood in its own selju'o. --xorxes
      • The le djuno is true according to its le velju'o, of course! Is that all you meant? I thought you were trying to say no djuno ka'e djuno da poi jitfa le kamfatci; not the trivial no djuno ka'e djuno da fo de va'o le du'u da jitfa de --la xod
        • le kamfatci is of course a very tendentious description. Everybody would want to use it for their own velju'o, as you use it here to refer to yours/ours. The claim is not so trivial, it only applies to "know"/djuno, it doesn't apply to krici, birti, jinvi... In your claim, you left both the velju'o and the seljitfa implicit. How were we supposed to understand that the velju'o and the seljitfa were not meant to be the same? --xorxes
          • go'i ma'i ma ni'o .ianai do jinvi le du'u da ka'e krici de poi da djuno to'ebo de fo zo'e .i mi'e la xod
            • i li'a mi na jinvi la'e di'u i roda rode zo'u le nu djuno da fo de cu se sarcu le nu da jetnu de iku'i le nu krici da na se sarcu le nu da jetnu i li'a le krici be da cu krici le du'u da jetnu i ku'i la'e di'u na nibli le du'u da jetnu
              • go'i le du'u da jetnu ba'e ma
                • i ji'i no de zo'u le du'u krici da cu nibli le du'u da jetnu dei ro de zo'u le du'u djuno da fo de cu nibli le du'u da jetnu de
                  • .iseni'ibo ka'e krici da gi'e djuno to'ebo da .i fenki
                  • I don't know what logic you're using to reach that conclusion. If you know something, you must believe it, of course. You cannot believe something and know at the same time that it is not true. Anything you know must be true (in the ontology of the knowledge), but things that you believe need not be true: you can realize later that they are false, and still admit that you used to believe them. Sorry about the switch to English but you are not understanding my Lojban. --xorxes
                  • If you believe something to be true, you djuno it in your le velju'o. You can't believe in something that you don't think is true! And the concept is so silly that to defend it, I see you had to switch to the alternate case of somebody believing in something and LATER realizing that it was false. In the first state, they both krici and djuno that idea, and after the realization, they do not krici, and they djuno to'ebo da. You'll notice that I am refusing to use the word "know", which imports unlojbanic, controversial baggage. --la xod

ko'a djuno ko'e fo ko'i requires ko'a krici ko'e and ko'e jetnu ko'i.ko'a krici ko'e does not require ko'e jetnu da.I am lost as to what you dispute of that. --xorxes

  • It's a trivial truth that if someone believes something, it is true for them. I can only assume that you are reverting back to the notion of jetnu zi'o; truth without any le selje'u; Absoltute Truth.
    • No, I think you're obfuscating. Consider these two cases:Case 1 - John believes that Mary is home. He doesn't know that she went to the market.Case 2- John knows that Mary is home. He doesn't believe that she went to the market.The only compatible truth with case 1 is that Mary went to the market. The only compatible truth with case 2 is that she is home. This has nothing to do with any Absolute Truth.
      • I am afraid you are getting confused with English translations. krici doesn't import all the baggage of "believe". In English, "believe" gets used in contrast to "know" to signify belief in a falsehood. In English, the sentence "He believes the table is red, but she knows it's blue" means that according to the authority of the speaker, the table is blue. "Know" is like djuno but with djuno4 set to that of the speaker. In Lojban, krici means only the psychological state of belief, and says nothing about the truth of the belief. This is why the English sentence "He knows the table is red, but she knows it's blue" is a contradiction. Hence, with English semantics, and all its implicit implications, you are correct up above, but the Lojban translations don't carry the same meanings. --la xod
  • (That's why I referred to le kamfatci way back there.) Thus, apparently you are stating the trivial truth that believing something doesn't make it empirically confirmable. I am not disputing that. But believing something indicates that you think/feel/will assert/are certain that it's true.
    • Of course you will. But thinking/feeling/asserting/being certain that something is true, does not require it to be true.
  • (And the fact that such notions are subject to change over time is completely irrelevant: let's hold time constant and discuss an instant, if that's distracting you.
    • That's fine. I have no problem admiting that some belief that I have now, something I really believe to be true, may actually be false now. Time has nothing to do with it. Something that I think I know may also be false, in which case I don't really know it, even though I believe that I know it. See the difference? I can believe a falsehood, but not know one, only believe that I know it. (Same for krici and djuno.)
      • No, not the same for krici and djuno. See my paragraph above.
        • I saw your paragraph and I don't find anything to disagree with. djuno is intimately related to jetnu. krici is an independent notion, it is not related to jetnu.
          • Except, psychological consistency (sanity) requires that le jei da krici de kei cu pabdu'i le jei de jetnu tu'a ba'e da.
      • Translate "krici" as "W has a mental state such that X is accepted to be true", and translate "djuno" as "W internally claims that X is true, as compatible with W's meme-complex Y" --la xod
        • I don't know what a meme-complex is. We seem to have come to an agreement about krici though.
  • Also, please don't be distracted by belief values along (0, 1) exclusive; we can deal with those trivially by upgrading all truth values in the model from binary to (0, 1) inclusive.) Therefore, ju'a le jei da krici de kei cu pabdu'i le jei de jetnu tu'a da.
    • No! Plese don't include my mistaken beliefs in any ontology/epistemology attributed to me! I am not so conceited as to think that everything I believe is true. Notice the difference: ro da zo'u ganai mi krici da gi mi krici le du'u da jetnu For every x, if I believe x then I believe that x is true. But: mi na krici le du'u ro da zo'u ganai mi krici da gi da jetnu I don't believe that for every x, if I believe x then x is true.
      • If you insist that you believe things you know are false, I have no choice but to consider you mentally incompetent.
        • That's very kind of you. Where did I say anything like that though? Did you read what I wrote?
          • You left open the possibility that you might hold "mistaken" beliefs. Now, "mistaken" by whose standard?
            • By my standards. I am quite sure that some of my beliefs are mistaken, though I cannot tell you which ones, for if I could I would no longer hold them as beliefs.
              • As a mass you may suspect that some of your beliefs are incorrect, yet, if we inspected each of your beliefs individually, you would assert the truth of every one. Since there is not a single one of your beliefs you would label as false, none of them are mistaken according to you! --la xod
                • Speak for yourself! Do you really think that none of your beliefs are mistaken? I never claimed that for my beliefs. I repeat:(1) ro da su'o de zo'u ganai mi krici da gi mi krici le du'u da jetnu de(2) mi krici le du'u ro da su'o de zo'u ganai mi krici da gi da jetnu de(2) does NOT follow from (1). In my case, (1) is true and (2) is false. Of course for every one of my beliefs I believe that it is true. But I don't believe that "every one of my beliefs is true". If you can't tell apart those two notions I don't know how else to explain them. You are saying that (2) follows from (1), but it doesn't.
                  • cinri fa le terfrica be la'e lo'u le selkri le'u bei la'e lo'u lei selkri le'u
                  • Why the error quotes? The distinction is not about masses though. If you read my Lojban, the distinction is in whether the quantification is inside or outside of the belief.
                    • Now come on, Jorge! Arguing philosophy is quite enough without having to dispute who is saying what! You said " Of course for every one of my beliefs I believe that it is true.", which refers to each of your beliefs, taken individually." And you continued with "But I don't believe that "every one of my beliefs is true."", which refers to all of your beliefs taken as a mass.
                    • No it does not. Did you read the Lojban part? It says mi na krici le du'u ro le mi selkri cu jetnu da. For the nth time: if you take each of my beliefs on its own, I of course believe it. But I don't believe the general statement that "for each x which is a belief of mine, x is true". For each belief, I'm prepared to claim that it is true, but I am not prepared to claim "each of my beliefs is true". This is not about masses. I simply don't believe that each and every one of my beliefs is true. I also don't believe that any person's each and every belief is true. I don't believe in such infallibility.
                    • I read that to mean that, taken as a mass, you claim that some of the beliefs are false, but taken individually you will assert that each one is true. I resolve the apparent contradiction in the next sentence: You realize that each of your beliefs COULD be false, while believing them all staunchly at the present moment. Your potential to renounce them in the future shouldn't be confused with weakening your present belief!
                    • You misread it then. That's not what I meant. I did not mean to take them as a mass. Is belief in a time invariant velju'o an acceptable velju'o?
                    • As for sentence 2, I never claimed it of you. I claimed the du'u bridi there, not the main bridi.--la xod
                    • ??!! The du'u bridi is the belief which you insist on attributing to me, and I insist on refusing.
                    • I never claimed you believed it. Why would I argue if I already believed that you agreed with me? I said that it is a fact and that sanity requires it. --la xod
                    • Ok, I thought you believed me sane, my mistake then. --xorxes
                  • .i ku'i ja'o se'i ganai ro le mi selkri ca cu'u jetnu tu'a mi gi piro lei mi selkri ca cu'u jetnu tu'a mi .enai ju'ocu'i tu'a mi pe lo balvi
                  • i ro le mi selkri ba'e na jetnu tu'a mi i su'o sy jitfa tu'a mi i ku'i mi na djuno le du'u le mokau cu jitfa --mi'e xorxes
                    • Your first sentence is contradicted by what I just reminded you that you wrote. ro le takes them individually.
                    • No it is not. Please read it again more carefully.
                    • Do me a favor. Explain the meaning of "For each beliefs, I'm prepared to claim that it is true, but I am not prepared to claim "each of my beliefs is true"". How are you willing to perform an operation on each one taken individually, but you won't perform the operation on them all at once? --la xod
                    • Because the operation is not associative. mi krici ge le du'u broda gi le du'u brode does not entail mi krici le du'u ge broda gi brode. For two connectands it is not so obvious, because most people will believe the conjunction if they believe each of the conjoined. Notice that the conjunction is a third belief. But for ro selkri, I thought it was fairly obvious that believing each of them does not require that you also believe that they are all true. --xorxes
          • It is trivial to state that you might hold beliefs that later inspection could reveal to be empirically false!
            • Ok, so you agree that I can have beliefs that are false, even by my own personal criteria of what is false, but which I haven't realized yet that are false.
          • So I had to conclude, assuming your sentence had nontrivial cognitive value, that you meant that you felt the beliefs were mistaken, and yet continued to believe them. Only an insane mind can "believe" something it thinks is false. --la xod
            • Can a sane mind believe that some of its beliefs are false, even if it doesn't know which ones they are?
      • You cannot hold a "mistaken belief"; a belief you feel is mistaken!
        • I can't hold a belief that I feel is mistaken. I can hold a belief that is mistaken but which I feel is not mistaken. A belief can be false without my feeling that it is false, can't it?
      • A sane person's belief in X is proportional to how true they think X is. Once you discover that a certain belief is actually false, you must revise your belief-status instantly and accordingly. And your Lojban is faulty because you are, yet again, dropping le selje'u!--la xod
        • Please fill it with zo'e to "fix" my faulty Lojban.
          • zo'e isn't good enough; you need to be explicit because sometimes you use zo'e to mean the observer's le velju'o, and other times you use it to mean le kamfatci. And at least once I have guessed incorrectly. Please, save me the guesswork! --la xod
        • How can you discover that a certain belief is false if according to you every belief is true?
          • By the method of selection of le velju'o; which in English translates approximately to "epistemology", and more accurately as the bilingual term "meta-le velju'o".
            • Is there one meta-velju'o for everyone, or does everyone have their own meta-velju'o? If everyone has their own, how does it differ from a plain velju'o?
              • What makes one person pragmatic and skeptical, and another spiritual & superstitious, and yet another completely conformist, willing to believe whatever the majority decides? Here are three meta-le velju'o.--la xod
  • And to directly address the final sentence of your last response, that's a very bold claim you're making, since you didn't establish any relationship between ko'a and da. You're saying that it's possible to believe an idea that's not true in ANY le velju'o. Considering how bizarre some of the le velju'o are I've seen, it's incredible to claim there is a single belief that doesn't fit into any conceivable le velju'o.
    • I haven't seen many velju'o around. In fact, I'm not sure I could recognize one if you put one in front of my nose. I hope you're not saying that any old set of beliefs constitutes a velju'o.
      • Well how can you argue about le velju'o if you are unclear what it means?
        • I argue about lots of things I'm unclear about. If I were totally clear about it what would be the point of arguing?
      • A le velju'o is like a function that accepts a statement and returns a truth value.
        • Any such function, or only some such functions that satisfy some other requirements (like some kind of self consistency)?
          • Do you mean consistency over time?
            • No, I meant internal self-consistency, but that was just one possible restriction. My question stands unanswered: is a velju'o any function that accepts a statement and returns a truth value, or only some such functions? For example, is every velju'o strictly tied to a given person's beliefs?
              • I am not sure. Let's assume any function is applicable. Will we run into trouble this way? --la xod
                • Depends what you mean by run into trouble, it dilutes the notion of velju'o to near meaninglessness. There's a velju'o that returns true for every statement, another that returns false for every statement, others that return random values for every statement. Why is it interesting to have a special name for all of these functions, which have nothing to do with knowledge?
                  • Does the fact that there are a staggering number of conflicting ideas and interpretations of philosophies somehow dilute the idea of philosophy to "near meaninglessness"?
                  • 'A staggering number' is much much less than 'any function that accepts a statement and returns a truth value'.
                  • Many an undergrad would agree! You are free, in the interests of simplicity and analysis, to ignore minor differences between vy. and look for patterns and classes among them.
                  • Maybe velju'o are somewhat like languages. Everyone's language is in a sense unique, although for example everyone who speaks what we call 'English' share to a significant extent in the 'same' language. In a sense we can also say that all languages are really one language but each of us only knows some parts of it, and we can comunicate with those who know more or less the same parts. Something similar would happen with velju'o: two people can only understand each other if they are using the same or similar enough velju'o, otherwise the claims of one will seem like nonsense to the other. I wonder whether you and I are talking in the same velju'o, since we seem to have so much trouble making sense of what the other is saying... --xorxes
                    • Good point.
      • "Belief system" is a subclass of vy., since they are codified and official, whereas vy. don't need to be so formalized. To be completely pedantic, everyone has a vy., only one at any given moment, and everyone's is different, although some are difficult to distinguish apart. Perhaps it's a purely Lojbanic concept, and I sense that you're hostile to anything that can't be easily described in English.
        • So according to you a velju'o is the set of beliefs that a person holds at any given time, is that correct? Are there any other kind of velju'o, besides these personal ones? This would make meaningless the distinction between djuno and krici. Is it possible for person A and person B to djuno something by the same velju'o?
          • The main difference between krici and djuno is emphasis, as well as the sumti places. As for identical le velju'o, we can say that the vy. on spiritual issues might be the same between co-religionists who have no open disputes about theology. But no two minds are identical, and somewhere a minute difference of interpretation could be discovered through exhaustive interrogation. But for "all intents and purposes" we can call the two vy. the same. --la xod
            • Let's leave the hard cases out and deal with the easy ones first. If I believe Mary is home, but John believes that she went to the market, is that proof that John's velju'o is different from my own?
              • There, I would say that I have to contradict the above on "the main difference between krici and djuno" - because while it seems plausible, your example given here is something that, unless you have a really messed up velju'o, is an exemple of contradicting selkri but no selju'o at all. - mi'e. .kreig.daniyl.
                • Craig, you should read carefully what I wrote above concerning the implications of "believe", when used in contrast to "know", in English. Those semantic games do not translate! Jorge, it's possible you and John have different information and the same vy. If that's the case, the ignorant one would accept correction from the knowledgeable one. But let's consider that you are a hard headed man of science, and John is a witch doctor who got his information from a burnt turtle shell. With such a differing vy. you'll give his word very little credence! --la xod
                  • So if John and I have the same vy, one of us holds a mistaken belief, right? (Of course I will believe it is John who is mistaken and John will believe it is me, until we sort it out.)
      • vy. is not precisely "epistemology"; "epistemology" is the closest possible English word the LLG could come up with in a pinch. It's full meaning must be discerned through insight, and clue from Cowan never hurt either. --la xod
        • The clue contradicts your suggestion that everyone has only one velju'o at any given moment. It says that someone can have two (contradictory) velju'o at the same time.
          • I think you should re-read the note. --la xod
            • Ok. I quote: "After Galileo, some people held that the heliocentric theory of the solar system was theologically false, but philosophically (i.e. scientifically) true. For Y substitute "science"; for Z substitute "theology"." I interpret that as saying that some people had two contradictory velju'o at a given moment. Am I mistaken?
              • This is a matter of kricing, not of djunoing. They held that it was both true and false, they didn't djuno it. You are forgetting that djuno is about certain knowledge, and cannot be used to approximate believe if the belief cannot be true under a selju'o which is similar to the velju'o. Also, the by epistemology x4 would imply (to me) that the velju'o includes the criteria for generating a truth value for an input, but not any axioms that are accepted as true. These must be true under the selje'u that you are using as your velju'o or you krici the belief, you don't djuno it.
                • When you distinguish krici from djuno with such vigor, I think you are needlessly importing delicate shades of English meaning into Lojban. It seems to me you came up with a sentence that works in English (and that I agree with), substituted {"belief", "know"} with {"krici", "djuno"} and typed away. krici lacks a selje'u place because it's not central to the idea, not because it can't apply at all. Who says "djuno" is about "certain" knowledge? Did you mean "certain relative to Absolute Truth", or "certain relative to the le velju'o"? In Lojban, "jetnu" has a second place. This is important. A person can know that a certain fact is in agreement with a certain body of other facts; can they really know anything else? --la xod
                • I agree with you. I was quoting Cowan. Neither his nor la xod's notion of velju'o convince me, but also they don't seem to agree with each other. --xorxes
                  • I was using le velju'o subjectively; as a person's actual belief system. Cowan is using it objectively; every belief system a person is familiar with. I can accept his definition; it is symbolic and more testable, whereas actual conviction is difficult to discern except through actions. --la xod
  • Contradicting you, I claim ro selkri cu mapti su'o velju'o .i ju'a ro krici be da cu mapti su'o velju'o poi da jetnu ke'a. This is really not a controversial idea! --la xod
    • .i vu'enaidai do du'eroi pilno lo'u jetnu zi'o le'u .i ku'i nalfatci mubydarlu .i za'a do tugni le du'u roda rode zo'u ganai da krici ja birti ja jinvi de gi de jetnu tu'a da .i mi'e la xod
      • i mi ba'e na tugni i le du'u xukau jetnu na fancu le du'u xukau krici ja birti ja jinvi i mi'e xorxes
        • nodida'o smuni .i le fancu cu cmene le steci velfancu
        • I meant "Whether something is true or not is not a function of whether or not someone believes it, is sure about it, or has an opinion about it". Please suggest a better way of saying it. --xorxes
        • fancu le jei krici da kei le jei da jetnu kei nodida'o

I am leaving a collection of gismu on this subject here.

It seems to me ya'll are confusing sruma & djuno. (mi'e maikl.) I think it is worth discussing whether sruma is like ja'acu'i jinvi, or jinvi fozi'o, or something else. My understanding of djuno, however, is very far from the usage here...

I'm gonna take a stab at something, this is several trains of thought all derailing at once: As far as I can deduce based on this, xod is arguing that you can djuno a falsehood, and I tend to agree. I have personally had instances when I knew that I had done a task (say, fed my cat). I did not believe this, I had actually fed the cat so I had external evidence (krici doesn't apply). Unfortunately, I had fed the cat dogfood so my task was not accomplished. I knew that I had fed the cats, but because I had unintentionally done it wrong, I was caught knowing a falsehood. This isn't a perfect example, you can argue that I changed meanings of the term 'feed the cat' halfway through, and I technically did, but its the best example I can come up with off the top of my head. Think about it, you've certainly been in a similar position where you knew you had done something but in reality that thing had not been accomplished. But should I use djuno for this un-true knowledge?

Also, what about being decieved? To use a particularly bad analogy, James Bond knew that 008 was on his side (he had evidence to support it and none to contradict it) yet that knowledge was untrue.

One more: just because I have evidence that something is true doesn't make it true. I understand that krici and djuno hinge on evidence as their differentiation, if I'm mistaken in this assumption/understanding then my whole argument is bunk.

My Proposal: Perhaps there should be a more clear distinction between sruma, djuno and krici: sruma and krici should be used where we normally use "know" in english, and djuno should be reserved for things that can be/are intended to be Objective, Big-T-Truth things?

  • There is never any such thing as objective truth, which is why I find this whole argument pointless and inane. -Robin Lee Powell
    • In the real world, you're right but if you're arguing against objective truth, what is the difference between djuno and sruma? --Skorgu

A narrator could say, for example, la .djamz bond. sruma lenu la nonobi pendo la .djamz. .ije la nonobi nalpendo la .djamz. .i mi djuno la nonobi nalpendo la .djamz. (what's the best way to express 'but' in this context? I used .ije because it emphasizes the fact that they're both true but is there a way to imply contradiction?)

or, you can't use djuno unless you're intending it to be Objectively True e.g. as a narrator in a book would know the Objective truth of a statement. I imagine it would be used in real life/conversation only as hyperbole :) Just a suggestion.


English Lojban

know sruma (but no negative connotation of assume in english, just human-limited knowledge. Could be supported by evidence and still false)

assume krici (un-supported by evidence, a true assumption)

Know?? djuno (Objective Truth Only. not useful in normal conversation except as hyperbole. useful for god-narrators and omniscient characters)


  • If you'd be willing to claim broda is true by stating broda, why wouldn't you be willing to claim something which implies it: djuno lo du'u broda? Practically the point in language is to make claims about the truth-values of statements, so what's so excessive about claiming the truth of propositions other than the one you're directly expressing? 4D enthusiast (talk) 08:09, 24 June 2016 (PDT)

Why does this one never go away, even after 30 odd years? Well, I see that there is an intention to change the meanings again, but let me remind everyone of where this started in 1955 and what was the orthodoxy until recently.

  • krici is just about a psychological relation between a person and a proposition (and the subject of that proposition, but that WAS a mistake -- going back to the days before subject-raising had a clear expression).
  • jinvi is that same relation but now adding a body of evidence on the basis of which the propositions can be claimed to cohere with some "reality"
  • djuno expands jinvi in two ways: 1) the evidence (which might be very slight) is now expanded to a full "epistemology" (which, btw, is about the worst possible English word for this), a set of propositions (not a function, since it can be inconsistent): more than 1 but usually less than a complete set and 2) the proposition involved has to be true in that set -- either a member or derivable from members by devices giving more than probability (and by a derivation not directly involving contradictory members -- and, I suppose, a pile of other conditions).
  • birti is off in another direction, about degrees of confidence -- though strangely without reference of evidence sets, which seem to fit in here.
  • sruma is the only real puzzle -- it seems to be a form of krici, but is not, since one can assume something one believes false (and, indeed, for the purpose of showing it false). It may share with English "assume" the opposite relation to krici from jinvi: believes without conmsulting any evidence -- or on the basis of inappropriate evidence. This needs some work.