View source for Talk:xorlo & mi nitcu lo mikce

''Archived Tiki forum discussion for [[xorlo & mi nitcu lo mikce]]. Original authors, UTC times, and post IDs are retained below.''

== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce (Tiki thread #3487) ==

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-11 21:35 UTC · Tiki post #3488 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">[Am experimentally cross-posting to wikidiscuss-list. If it works,
I'll discontinue the thread from Lojban list.]

xorxes:
&gt; --- And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; But let me reask my question, because it hasn't been
&gt; &gt; answered yet. "PA broda" can apply to PA subkinds of Brodakind
&gt; &gt; or to PA things that are classified as having the property of
&gt; &gt; being broda.
&gt;
&gt; Right, but {lo} does not make that distinction. A subkind
&gt; of brodakind is nothing but a thing classified as having the property
&gt; of being broda.

This can't be right. Subkinds of, say, Mr Dog exist by virtue of being
conceivable/imaginable, whereas instances of Mr Dog, viz things that
I classify as having doghood, exist by virtue of having material
existence (since that is a necessary condition of doghood). I accept
that this is an ontological distinction. But I think it's a
distinction it is needful to be able to make somehow.

&gt; &gt; -- Xorlo generalizes over that dichotomy, which is
&gt; &gt; fair enough, but since it is a distinction that underlies the
&gt; &gt; two nonspecific readings of "I need a doctor", it would be
&gt; &gt; nice to have a way of making the distinction if one wanted to.
&gt;
&gt; I'm not sure it is a pure dichotomy. {mi nitcu su'o lo mikce}
&gt; can't have the "I need any doctor" reading. Neither of two
&gt; "I need any doctor" possible readings in fact: "I need any individual
&gt; who is a doctor", or "I need any kind of doctor".

Yes, you're right, &amp; I was wrong on that point.

&gt; &gt; That is, given "mi nitcu re mikce", it would be nice to
&gt; &gt; have a way of signalling whether the truth-conditions of
&gt; &gt; the sentence are to involve checking through the subkinds of
&gt; &gt; Mr Doctor (&amp; seeing whether I need exactly two of them)
&gt;
&gt; That's exactly what it always involves. The tricky part is
&gt; figuring out what counts as a subkind in the given context.
&gt; Perhaps in the case of doctors there are usually only two
&gt; obvious choices: either specialists of a given speciality, or
&gt; individuals. But for other brivla there may be other options.
&gt;
&gt; &gt; or,
&gt; &gt; on the other hand, checking through the things in the material
&gt; &gt; world that are classified as having the property of doctorhood
&gt; &gt; (&amp; seeing whether I need exactly two of them).
&gt;
&gt; The (present?) material world is not especially favoured by the
&gt; _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, although it is a very
&gt; frequent obvious choice in many contexts.

Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous
claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of
doctorhood in the world in which I need them. In other words,
that one can go out into the world in which my needing occurs,
and find &amp; grab hold of these two individuals that are doctors.

For clarity, a second example: There is an ambiguity in "I drew
two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate two unicorns". How
can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted to do so?

&gt; &gt; I'm not saying that this is something the BPFK gadri proposals
&gt; &gt; should have covered; but I find it hard to imagine how
&gt; &gt; the distinction could be marked other than by gadri and,
&gt; &gt; obviously, the matter occurs to me because in ancestral
&gt; &gt; versions of xorlo the distinction was made.
&gt;
&gt; I think that unless the grammar is to impose an ontology,
&gt; that distinction can't be made with gadri. One way to make
&gt; it is through prediacates: "is a subkind of", "is an instance
&gt; of"

I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance of lo mikce"
would not guarantee that we are referring to actual instances;
we could be referring to imaginable instances. That's why
I can't see how to do it without involving gadri. (More
precisely, I can't see how to do it without having a way
to distinguish quantification over subkinds from quantification
over instances.)

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-11 21:35 UTC · Tiki post #3489 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 07:42:32PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; [Am experimentally cross-posting to wikidiscuss-list. If it works,
&gt; I'll discontinue the thread from Lojban list.]

It works, except that now there's forum topic named "Re: [lojban]
Re: xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce", which is why I asked you to start
threads using the forum, so the subject line could be preserved.

Oh well; it's no big deal.

-Robin</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-12 02:46 UTC · Tiki post #3688 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">[Sigh!]
Incoherent as I believe xorlo to be (as presented
anyhow) and consequently so likely to come up
with unexpected changes, I did think that it had
finally gotten away from trying to fit
intensional objects in with extensional ones and
(apparently felt to be related) abstracta in with
concreta.  How uncharacteristically sanguine of
me.  Assuming that &amp; is correctly presenting an
intended option in xorlo (and the responses seem
to assure this), the muck -- which is nicely
sorted out in the old Lojban -- is with us again.
 I am really sorry that there are so many people
who cannot handle intensional objects and
abstracts in Lojban (though presumably they can
in their native language, if not very
consciously) but they aregoing to turn up
whatever you do so learn to deal with them.  
In ancient Lojban (before some change or other
that I have lost track of) there were (as there
were always are) two ways to deal with
intensional cases (failures of quantification and
identity): designate some places as intensional
contexts or designate those places as requiring
situational terms (terms for events or properties
or some other abstract thing).  Without one or
the other of these -- it doesn't matter which and
old Lojban used a mixture, which is fine too --
semantic ambguities and invalid inferences will
be supported on the grammatical level. We had all
that is needed, we just consistently refused to
use it, claiming, I gather, that it was somehow
"wrong," (meaning generally that when we made
untinking translations from English -- or carried
our English or whatever habits over to Lojban, we
failed to use the right forms and so said
something we did not mean, since English (and SAE
languages generally) is notoriously bad (see the
history of western Philosophy)in this area. 
Rather than devoting a small amount to time to
learning to do things right, an enormous amount
to time has been spent in trying to find a way to
make our natural English habits correct in
Lojban. Pooh! 
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-12 14:03 UTC · Tiki post #3689 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">&gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; The (present?) material world is not especially favoured by the
&gt; &gt; _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, although it is a very
&gt; &gt; frequent obvious choice in many contexts.
&gt; 
&gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous
&gt; claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of
&gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need them.
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That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the 
property of being a doctor".

&gt; In other words,
&gt; that one can go out into the world in which my needing occurs,
&gt; and find &amp; grab hold of these two individuals that are doctors.

By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of things that we may 
make reference to in a given discourse. In one context, {lo mikce}
may have a single referent in the universe of discourse, in other
contexts it may have more than one.  In any context, 
{mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two of the referents of
{lo mikce} (from all the referents of the universe of discourse)
are such that I need them. In that discourse, I don't need any 
of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from all the referents
in the universe of discourse).

&gt; For clarity, a second example: There is an ambiguity in "I drew
&gt; two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate two unicorns". How
&gt; can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted to do so?

Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is like "I took 
a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew two unicorns"
that is like "I made two unicorns out of clay"? maybe we can
distinguish them with different predicates:

  mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna
  I picture-created two unicorns. 

  mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna
  I picture-copy-made two unicorns.

You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't
eat them into existence, so that would be the difference
between those predicates. 

&gt; &gt; I think that unless the grammar is to impose an ontology,
&gt; &gt; that distinction can't be made with gadri. One way to make
&gt; &gt; it is through prediacates: "is a subkind of", "is an instance
&gt; &gt; of"
&gt; 
&gt; I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance of lo mikce"
&gt; would not guarantee that we are referring to actual instances;
&gt; we could be referring to imaginable instances. That's why
&gt; I can't see how to do it without involving gadri. (More
&gt; precisely, I can't see how to do it without having a way
&gt; to distinguish quantification over subkinds from quantification
&gt; over instances.)

Would that require fixing the universe of discourse
to the one set of referents we all agree are true material
indivisible objects in the real meterial world, irrespective
of context? I don't think that's desirable, but I'm not sure
it's even possible. For some broda we may all agree on what 
counts as a true individual concrete real single broda for
any and all contexts, but for many broda we won't, it will 
depend on context.

mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
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=== Re: xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-12 15:29 UTC · Tiki post #3691 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">(This was sent to pc privately by mistake.
I don't know if pc's post was sent to the forums list
or just to me, probably just to me but intended for the
list. pc, if you still have your post you may want to 
repost it, as I have not included everything in my response.)

--- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; This notion of "universe of discourse" is fraught
&gt; with practical difficulties e.g., are things in
&gt; the physical environment in the universe or not

In some contexts they are, in other contexts they 
are not.

&gt; and, if not, how can I then introduce them, 

Mentioning something immediately introduces it
into the discourse.

&gt;or ,
&gt; if so, what is excluded?)

There is no general answer. When I say that there
is nothing in the box, air molecules are normally
excluded from the universe of discourse, but once 
I mention them, we have to admit that there is 
something in the box after all.
  
&gt; but it also does not
&gt; solve the {mi nitcu lo mikce} problem, which is
&gt; about scope, not range: {mi nitcu lo mikce} does
&gt; not generally even entail (let alone be
&gt; equivalent to) {lo mikce zo'u mi nitcu my}, since
&gt; whatever doctor(s) we pick is not needed for
&gt; another would do as well.

In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of discourse 
contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for those
who don't mind that picture. If you can't picture
doctors as just doctors, and you necessarily must 
picture them as an aggregate of many individual 
doctors, each considered separately, then you must
take another course, for example (mi nitcu lo nu
da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats me" or 
something like that. Here you are picturing all 
{lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr Someone-Treats-Me"
that you need, but some people mind doing this 
abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" 
abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to abstract 
than people.
  
&gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence, but
&gt; &gt; you can't
&gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be the
&gt; &gt; difference
&gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; 
&gt; Category mistake.  Pictures of unicorns aren't
&gt; unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) -- see
&gt; the fronting problem again if nothing else. 

That seems like an ontology issue. Are teddy-bears bears? 
CLL says they are, if I recall corrrectly. I say it depends 
on the context (maybe that's what CLL says too). The same 
with pictures of unicorns. I don't think there needs to be a 
special gadri to sort teddy-bears from more central bears,
or drawn unicorns from clay unicorns from flesh-and-blood
unicorns.

mu'o mi'e xorxes</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xod · 2005-01-13 18:01 UTC · Tiki post #3692 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">John E Clifford wrote:

&gt;[Sigh!]
&gt;  
&gt;

Why has the new proposal been met with universal acceptance, even by the 
esteemed Dr. Rosta?

Why have you failed to offer an alternative proposal lacking in the 
perceived defects, or succeeded in defending the previous system as it was?



-- 
 "The more you tighten your grip, Tarkin, the more star systems will slip through your fingers."</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-13 18:01 UTC · Tiki post #3693 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; --- Jorge Llambías 
&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; Mentioning something immediately introduces it
&gt; &gt; into the discourse.
&gt; 
&gt; But, in order to mention it and thus bring it
&gt; into the universe, it has to be somewhere already
&gt; (in some sense). 

Well, if it was somewhere already, we could define that
somewhere as the one true universe of discourse fixed
once and for all for every utterance in every context. 
I don't think there is such a somewhere.

&gt; In particular, suppose I say
&gt; "some cows" or "there are cows that," what cows
&gt; have introduced?  the ones that satisfy the rest
&gt; of the sentence? 

No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some cows"
"all cows" or "no cows" just introduces cows.
{ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo bakni}
and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni} to
have referents in the universe of discourse.
The quantifiers just quantify over those referents,
they don't introduce them.

&gt; But the rest of the sentence
&gt; comes after the introduction -- the cows have to
&gt; be there in order to go on. And what if I am
&gt; wrong? I have introduced cows apparently but none
&gt; of them have the properties involved. So, maybe
&gt; by mentioning cows I introduce the lot of them. 
&gt; But then, what is excluded -- I mentioned
&gt; physical objects too, so are all of them in or is
&gt; it specific?

{lo dacti} in principle could have a single 
referent, "Mr Object".

&gt; I suspect this is all terminological, that
&gt; "universe of discourse" here means something more
&gt; restricted than usual (what has actually been
&gt; mentioned and perhaps what is going to be
&gt; mentioned in the foreseeable future, abstracted
&gt; from the broader notion of, say, the range of
&gt; quantifiers or the like).  A smidge of
&gt; clarification might be handy here -- and maybe
&gt; some new terminology as well.

You're welcome to suggest other terminology,
but I think "universe of discourse" is fairly
standard.

&gt; &gt; &gt;or ,
&gt; &gt; &gt; if so, what is excluded?)
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; There is no general answer. When I say that
&gt; &gt; there
&gt; &gt; is nothing in the box, air molecules are
&gt; &gt; normally
&gt; &gt; excluded from the universe of discourse, but
&gt; &gt; once 
&gt; &gt; I mention them, we have to admit that there is 
&gt; &gt; something in the box after all.
&gt; 
&gt; I didn't ask for a general answer in the sense of
&gt; a list of allthe things that are always in the
&gt; universe of discourse, only criteria for deciding
&gt; whjat is in and what is not.  Obviously
&gt; everything tha has been mentioned explicitly is
&gt; in.  Almost as obviously, some other things,
&gt; implicit in what has been said or about to be
&gt; mentioned, are also in, but what are the limits
&gt; -- by rule, not by list

I don't know the rule. Relevance will probably be
the most significant factor.

&gt; &gt; In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of
&gt; &gt; discourse 
&gt; &gt; contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for those
&gt; &gt; who don't mind that picture. If you can't
&gt; &gt; picture
&gt; &gt; doctors as just doctors, and you necessarily
&gt; &gt; must 
&gt; &gt; picture them as an aggregate of many individual
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; doctors, each considered separately, then you
&gt; &gt; must
&gt; &gt; take another course, for example (mi nitcu lo
&gt; &gt; nu
&gt; &gt; da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats me"
&gt; &gt; or 
&gt; &gt; something like that. Here you are picturing all
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr
&gt; &gt; Someone-Treats-Me"
&gt; &gt; that you need, but some people mind doing this 
&gt; &gt; abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" 
&gt; &gt; abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to
&gt; &gt; abstract 
&gt; &gt; than people.
&gt; 
&gt; Ah, the history of Philosophy: those who ignore
&gt; it are doomed to repeat it.  This is the kind of
&gt; metaphysical argle-bargle created by not paying
&gt; attenmtion to logic (or being to lazy to use it).
&gt;  There is no Mr. Doctor (shouldn't that be "Dr.
&gt; Doctor"?) and if there were, he would be of no
&gt; help in satisfying a person's needs.  Only a real
&gt; concrete doctor will do that, and further one who
&gt; is in the appropriate relation to the needer --
&gt; treating him, say. 

Mr Doctor (or Dr. Doctor if you prefer) is of course
real and concrete. Just like an event of a doctor
curing me has to be real and concrete in order to be
any use to me. I have no need for an event of a doctor
curing me if the event is not real and concrete.

&gt; The fact that we cannot
&gt; identify beforehand who that doctor is, indeed
&gt; that the need is indifferent to that issue, does
&gt; not mean that there is an indifferent doctor who
&gt; is needed or an unidentified one.  It only means
&gt; that the quantifier involved is within the scope
&gt; of the needing.
&gt; As for Mr. abstractions just being a variant of
&gt; event abstractions (and sometimes property or
&gt; truth function or... abstractions), the Lojban
&gt; answer is simply NO.  The event, property, and so
&gt; on abstractions are inherent in Lojban; the Mr.
&gt; abstractions -- assuming that it could be given
&gt; some meaningful interpretation (and all serious
&gt; attempts at this have failed so far) -- is a new
&gt; thing, not already provided for. That it is
&gt; being used to hi-jack an existing construction,
&gt; which had a perfectly good but different meaning,
&gt; does not mean that it was laready in Lojban.  It
&gt; is a foreign import and needs to be marked as
&gt; such.

It was first introduced in Loglan by JCB, so it can't be 
all that new.

&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence,
&gt; &gt; but
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; you can't
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be
&gt; &gt; the
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; difference
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Category mistake.  Pictures of unicorns
&gt; &gt; aren't
&gt; &gt; &gt; unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) --
&gt; &gt; see
&gt; &gt; &gt; the fronting problem again if nothing else. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; That seems like an ontology issue. Are
&gt; &gt; teddy-bears bears? 
&gt; &gt; CLL says they are, if I recall corrrectly. I
&gt; &gt; say it depends 
&gt; &gt; on the context (maybe that's what CLL says
&gt; &gt; too). The same 
&gt; &gt; with pictures of unicorns. I don't think there
&gt; &gt; needs to be a 
&gt; &gt; special gadri to sort teddy-bears from more
&gt; &gt; central bears,
&gt; &gt; or drawn unicorns from clay unicorns from
&gt; &gt; flesh-and-blood
&gt; &gt; unicorns.
&gt; 
&gt; I agree, this is not a gadri issue -- unless you
&gt; want to use the "what I am calling" aspect of
&gt; {le} to deal with the eccentric cases.  You
&gt; might, of course, say it is a brivla issue: what
&gt; exactly does a certain predicate mean (I take it
&gt; that this is the solution proposed for teddy
&gt; bears).  So, if {pavyseljirna} refers simply to a
&gt; shape (as Kung Sun Lung would have us believe)
&gt; then painting a picture of a unicorn presents no
&gt; problem: there is the unicorn I painted a picture
&gt; of, namely the shape of the picture itself.  This
&gt; of course makes for some very strange aesthetics:
&gt; it become hard to define realism, for example, or
&gt; portraiture in particular.  And it is rarely what
&gt; we mean.
&gt; 

(I think I didn't delete any of your stuff this time.
I believe your post was sent to me only, not to the 
list. I am responding to the list.)

mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:01 UTC · Tiki post #3694 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- 2 = 3 &lt;xod@thestonecutters.net&gt; wrote:

&gt; John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; 
&gt; &gt;[Sigh!]
&gt; &gt;  
&gt; &gt;
&gt; 
&gt; Why has the new proposal been met with
&gt; universal acceptance, even by the 
&gt; esteemed Dr. Rosta?
&gt; 
&gt; Why have you failed to offer an alternative
&gt; proposal lacking in the 
&gt; perceived defects, or succeeded in defending
&gt; the previous system as it was?

i CAN'T EXPLAIN IT (BEYOND WHAT i HAVE SAID ABOUT </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:01 UTC · Tiki post #3695 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">GD buttons!
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&gt; John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; 
&gt; &gt;[Sigh!]
&gt; &gt;  
&gt; &gt;
&gt; 
&gt; Why has the new proposal been met with
&gt; universal acceptance, even by the 
&gt; esteemed Dr. Rosta?
&gt; 
&gt; Why have you failed to offer an alternative
&gt; proposal lacking in the 
&gt; perceived defects, or succeeded in defending
&gt; the previous system as it was?

I can't explain it beyond what I have said about
it being so obscure that its long term effects
have remained hidden (Mr. Rabbit is new to the
field officially). I have proposed alternatives:
Lojban Formulae for one.  And I am under the
threat of being cut off from the list if I
criticize xorlo beyond responding to particular
points as they arise outside wiki.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-13 18:01 UTC · Tiki post #3696 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">xorxes:
&gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; The (present?) material world is not especially favoured by the
&gt; &gt; &gt; _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, although it is a very
&gt; &gt; &gt; frequent obvious choice in many contexts.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous
&gt; &gt; claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of
&gt; &gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need them.
&gt; 
&gt; That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the 
&gt; property of being a doctor".

I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? So that is not
synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a neutral question.)
 
&gt; &gt; In other words,
&gt; &gt; that one can go out into the world in which my needing occurs,
&gt; &gt; and find &amp; grab hold of these two individuals that are doctors.
&gt; 
&gt; By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of things that we may 
&gt; make reference to in a given discourse. In one context, {lo mikce}
&gt; may have a single referent in the universe of discourse, in other
&gt; contexts it may have more than one.  In any context, 
&gt; {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two of the referents of
&gt; {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the universe of discourse)
&gt; are such that I need them. In that discourse, I don't need any 
&gt; of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from all the referents
&gt; in the universe of discourse).

I understand this -- the universe of discourse can simultaneously
contain something that is a needer in World X but not necessarily
in World Y, and something that is a doctor in World Y but not 
necessarily in World X.

But what I'm asking is how to say "something is such that in
one and the same world, I need it and it is a doctor".

&gt; &gt; For clarity, a second example: There is an ambiguity in "I drew
&gt; &gt; two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate two unicorns". How
&gt; &gt; can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted to do so?
&gt; 
&gt; Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is like "I took 
&gt; a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew two unicorns"
&gt; that is like "I made two unicorns out of clay"? maybe we can
&gt; distinguish them with different predicates:
&gt; 
&gt;   mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna
&gt;   I picture-created two unicorns. 
&gt; 
&gt;   mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna
&gt;   I picture-copy-made two unicorns.
&gt; 
&gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't
&gt; eat them into existence, so that would be the difference
&gt; between those predicates. 

That's not really the distinction I mean. Our local mythology
may contain unicorns that already exist in that mythology.
I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, say) without
thereby bringing them into existence. But "I photographed
two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", entails that
the photographees exists in the same world as the one in
which I took the photo.

&gt; &gt; &gt; I think that unless the grammar is to impose an ontology,
&gt; &gt; &gt; that distinction can't be made with gadri. One way to make
&gt; &gt; &gt; it is through prediacates: "is a subkind of", "is an instance
&gt; &gt; &gt; of"
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance of lo mikce"
&gt; &gt; would not guarantee that we are referring to actual instances;
&gt; &gt; we could be referring to imaginable instances. That's why
&gt; &gt; I can't see how to do it without involving gadri. (More
&gt; &gt; precisely, I can't see how to do it without having a way
&gt; &gt; to distinguish quantification over subkinds from quantification
&gt; &gt; over instances.)
&gt; 
&gt; Would that require fixing the universe of discourse
&gt; to the one set of referents we all agree are true material
&gt; indivisible objects in the real meterial world, irrespective
&gt; of context? I don't think that's desirable, but I'm not sure
&gt; it's even possible. For some broda we may all agree on what 
&gt; counts as a true individual concrete real single broda for
&gt; any and all contexts, but for many broda we won't, it will 
&gt; depend on context.

I opine that a proposition is claimed to be true of some
particular world (-- and the universe of discourse can
span many worlds). I further opine that it is desirable to
have some way to indicate whether two propositions (such as
"mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true of the same 
world (since there seems to me to be a pretty patent
distinction in meaning).

I was about to explain what I meant by "instances", in the
light of what I have just said, but I'll take things slowly.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:02 UTC · Tiki post #3697 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; --- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; --- Jorge Llambías 
&gt; &gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; Mentioning something immediately introduces
&gt; it
&gt; &gt; &gt; into the discourse.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; But, in order to mention it and thus bring it
&gt; &gt; into the universe, it has to be somewhere
&gt; already
&gt; &gt; (in some sense). 
&gt; 
&gt; Well, if it was somewhere already, we could
&gt; define that
&gt; somewhere as the one true universe of discourse
&gt; fixed
&gt; once and for all for every utterance in every
&gt; context. 
&gt; I don't think there is such a somewhere.

Fair enough.  This is mainly just terminological,
universes of discourse are normally given in
advance and then references are assigned within
them.  If you want to build the uiniverse along
with the reference, I think that will work out
OK.  But it does have one off-putting
consequence:  The person who answers "What's in
the box?" with "Nothing" has given on xorxes'
view the right answer, there is nothing in the
universe of discourse in the box (I'm assuming
that air molecules have not been talked aobut
recently, since that would usually cue the
answerer to use them in the answer).  Thus, the
response pointing to the air molecules in the box
(we do agree that they were there all the time
don't we?) is not an acceptable correction (and
by the way bringing something from the universe
into the light) but a piece of Gricean dirty
pool, changing the game in mid stream.  Not a
move we ought to be recommending. 
&gt; &gt; In particular, suppose I say
&gt; &gt; "some cows" or "there are cows that," what
&gt; cows
&gt; &gt; have introduced?  the ones that satisfy the
&gt; rest
&gt; &gt; of the sentence? 
&gt; 
&gt; No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some cows"
&gt; "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces cows.
&gt; {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo bakni}
&gt; and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni} to
&gt; have referents in the universe of discourse.
&gt; The quantifiers just quantify over those
&gt; referents,
&gt; they don't introduce them.

Were the cows there before or not? If not then
the use of the expression must introduce them, if
they were there already, where are the limits? I
pass over our differences about what "refers"
means.
  
&gt; &gt; But the rest of the sentence
&gt; &gt; comes after the introduction -- the cows have
&gt; to
&gt; &gt; be there in order to go on. And what if I am
&gt; &gt; wrong? I have introduced cows apparently but
&gt; none
&gt; &gt; of them have the properties involved. So,
&gt; maybe
&gt; &gt; by mentioning cows I introduce the lot of
&gt; them. 
&gt; &gt; But then, what is excluded -- I mentioned
&gt; &gt; physical objects too, so are all of them in
&gt; or is
&gt; &gt; it specific?
&gt; 
&gt; {lo dacti} in principle could have a single 
&gt; referent, "Mr Object".

Not really.  Or rather this won't work with Mr.
Object (in old Lojban {lo dacti} in a particular
context does have a single referent -- the group
of dacti under consideration  -- but that doesn't
seem to be what "Mr. Object" means -- it has been
rejected at least twice in the last few years). 
So, if Mr Object is something that does all the
things it is supposed to do, it doesn't exist and
thus is no help at all.
 
&gt; &gt; I suspect this is all terminological, that
&gt; &gt; "universe of discourse" here means something
&gt; more
&gt; &gt; restricted than usual (what has actually been
&gt; &gt; mentioned and perhaps what is going to be
&gt; &gt; mentioned in the foreseeable future,
&gt; abstracted
&gt; &gt; from the broader notion of, say, the range of
&gt; &gt; quantifiers or the like).  A smidge of
&gt; &gt; clarification might be handy here -- and
&gt; maybe
&gt; &gt; some new terminology as well.
&gt; 
&gt; You're welcome to suggest other terminology,
&gt; but I think "universe of discourse" is fairly
&gt; standard.

It is standard, just not with this meaning, which
is why I had some trouble with it when you first
used it (and probably still do, since your
meaning is not very clear).
 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;or ,
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; if so, what is excluded?)
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; There is no general answer. When I say that
&gt; &gt; &gt; there
&gt; &gt; &gt; is nothing in the box, air molecules are
&gt; &gt; &gt; normally
&gt; &gt; &gt; excluded from the universe of discourse,
&gt; but
&gt; &gt; &gt; once 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I mention them, we have to admit that there
&gt; is 
&gt; &gt; &gt; something in the box after all.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I didn't ask for a general answer in the
&gt; sense of
&gt; &gt; a list of allthe things that are always in
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; universe of discourse, only criteria for
&gt; deciding
&gt; &gt; whjat is in and what is not.  Obviously
&gt; &gt; everything tha has been mentioned explicitly
&gt; is
&gt; &gt; in.  Almost as obviously, some other things,
&gt; &gt; implicit in what has been said or about to be
&gt; &gt; mentioned, are also in, but what are the
&gt; limits
&gt; &gt; -- by rule, not by list
&gt; 
&gt; I don't know the rule. Relevance will probably
&gt; be
&gt; the most significant factor.

Not very useful, since "relevance" is surely as
obscure as this is.  We only know what is
relevant when we see what comes up (possibly
including what comes up metaconversationally).
But by that time, you can look back at all the
things mentioned and say "That's the universe." 
The task is to say something useful about it in
medias res.

&gt; &gt; &gt; In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of
&gt; &gt; &gt; discourse 
&gt; &gt; &gt; contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for
&gt; those
&gt; &gt; &gt; who don't mind that picture. If you can't
&gt; &gt; &gt; picture
&gt; &gt; &gt; doctors as just doctors, and you
&gt; necessarily
&gt; &gt; &gt; must 
&gt; &gt; &gt; picture them as an aggregate of many
&gt; individual
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; doctors, each considered separately, then
&gt; you
&gt; &gt; &gt; must
&gt; &gt; &gt; take another course, for example (mi nitcu
&gt; lo
&gt; &gt; &gt; nu
&gt; &gt; &gt; da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats
&gt; me"
&gt; &gt; &gt; or 
&gt; &gt; &gt; something like that. Here you are picturing
&gt; all
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr
&gt; &gt; &gt; Someone-Treats-Me"
&gt; &gt; &gt; that you need, but some people mind doing
&gt; this 
&gt; &gt; &gt; abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor"
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to
&gt; &gt; &gt; abstract 
&gt; &gt; &gt; than people.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Ah, the history of Philosophy: those who
&gt; ignore
&gt; &gt; it are doomed to repeat it.  This is the kind
&gt; of
&gt; &gt; metaphysical argle-bargle created by not
&gt; paying
&gt; &gt; attenmtion to logic (or being to lazy to use
&gt; it).
&gt; &gt;  There is no Mr. Doctor (shouldn't that be
&gt; "Dr.
&gt; &gt; Doctor"?) and if there were, he would be of
&gt; no
&gt; &gt; help in satisfying a person's needs.  Only a
&gt; real
&gt; &gt; concrete doctor will do that, and further one
&gt; who
&gt; &gt; is in the appropriate relation to the needer
&gt; --
&gt; &gt; treating him, say. 
&gt; 
&gt; Mr Doctor (or Dr. Doctor if you prefer) is of
&gt; course
&gt; real and concrete. Just like an event of a
&gt; doctor
&gt; curing me has to be real and concrete in order
&gt; to be
&gt; any use to me. I have no need for an event of a
&gt; doctor
&gt; curing me if the event is not real and
&gt; concrete.

This is the old cyclic dodge -- not very
convincing.  We have in Lojban that events exist
even if they do not occur (this is not my
favorite way of doing things, but it works and
solves the problems).  So, what I need is for the
event to occur, meaning tht we should change the
definition of {nitcu} or -- as we have always
done -- sinmply take that as a give.  The problem
is that if Dr. Doctor occurs, we still have the
problem  To do what you want him to do, he has to
be abstract at least and so of no use at all.  On
the other hand, if what you mean is that a
manifestation of Dr. Dr occurs, then  we need to
change the definition of {nitcu} even more, since
that has not been what we have been doing
causually up til now. Further we have the same
problem: there is no manifestation that I need --
another one would always do, so on this reading
the claim is always false.  And of course, the
doctor being real is not enough; we still need
the appropriate event, without which my need
cannot be met.  So why not just say so straight
off -- or at least recognize that this is
generally what is meant even when not said and
make the corresponding caveats in the text (just
as we do in English).

  
&gt; &gt; The fact that we cannot
&gt; &gt; identify beforehand who that doctor is,
&gt; indeed
&gt; &gt; that the need is indifferent to that issue,
&gt; does
&gt; &gt; not mean that there is an indifferent doctor
&gt; who
&gt; &gt; is needed or an unidentified one.  It only
&gt; means
&gt; &gt; that the quantifier involved is within the
&gt; scope
&gt; &gt; of the needing.
&gt; &gt; As for Mr. abstractions just being a variant
&gt; of
&gt; &gt; event abstractions (and sometimes property or
&gt; &gt; truth function or... abstractions), the
&gt; Lojban
&gt; &gt; answer is simply NO.  The event, property,
&gt; and so
&gt; &gt; on abstractions are inherent in Lojban; the
&gt; Mr.
&gt; &gt; abstractions -- assuming that it could be
&gt; given
&gt; &gt; some meaningful interpretation (and all
&gt; serious
&gt; &gt; attempts at this have failed so far) -- is a
&gt; new
&gt; &gt; thing, not already provided for. That it is
&gt; &gt; being used to hi-jack an existing
&gt; construction,
&gt; &gt; which had a perfectly good but different
&gt; meaning,
&gt; 

=</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:02 UTC · Tiki post #3698 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:

&gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; The (present?) material world is not
&gt; especially favoured by the
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; _grammar_ as the universe of discourse,
&gt; although it is a very
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; frequent obvious choice in many contexts.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be able
&gt; to make unambiguous
&gt; &gt; &gt; claims to the effect that exactly two
&gt; things have the property of
&gt; &gt; &gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need
&gt; them.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two
&gt; things have the 
&gt; &gt; property of being a doctor".
&gt; 
&gt; I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}?
&gt; So that is not
&gt; synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a
&gt; neutral question.)
&gt;  
&gt; &gt; &gt; In other words,
&gt; &gt; &gt; that one can go out into the world in which
&gt; my needing occurs,
&gt; &gt; &gt; and find &amp; grab hold of these two
&gt; individuals that are doctors.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of
&gt; things that we may 
&gt; &gt; make reference to in a given discourse. In
&gt; one context, {lo mikce}
&gt; &gt; may have a single referent in the universe of
&gt; discourse, in other
&gt; &gt; contexts it may have more than one.  In any
&gt; context, 
&gt; &gt; {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two
&gt; of the referents of
&gt; &gt; {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the
&gt; universe of discourse)
&gt; &gt; are such that I need them. In that discourse,
&gt; I don't need any 
&gt; &gt; of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from
&gt; all the referents
&gt; &gt; in the universe of discourse).
&gt; 
&gt; I understand this -- the universe of discourse
&gt; can simultaneously
&gt; contain something that is a needer in World X
&gt; but not necessarily
&gt; in World Y, and something that is a doctor in
&gt; World Y but not 
&gt; necessarily in World X.
&gt; 
&gt; But what I'm asking is how to say "something is
&gt; such that in
&gt; one and the same world, I need it and it is a
&gt; doctor".

I can't really speak for Dr.Dr. but I suppose we
can do it with a prenexed quantified expression,
i.e., outside the **** (I won't say the dreaded
words out of kindness to weak sensibilities) and
probably also using token reflexive devices that
drag things out of those places: "that doctor
right over there," "my neighbor Dr. Brown", etc.

&gt; &gt; &gt; For clarity, a second example: There is an
&gt; ambiguity in "I drew
&gt; &gt; &gt; two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate
&gt; two unicorns". How
&gt; &gt; &gt; can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted
&gt; to do so?
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is
&gt; like "I took 
&gt; &gt; a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew
&gt; two unicorns"
&gt; &gt; that is like "I made two unicorns out of
&gt; clay"? maybe we can
&gt; &gt; distinguish them with different predicates:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt;   mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna
&gt; &gt;   I picture-created two unicorns. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt;   mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna
&gt; &gt;   I picture-copy-made two unicorns.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence, but
&gt; you can't
&gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be the
&gt; difference
&gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; 
&gt; That's not really the distinction I mean. Our
&gt; local mythology
&gt; may contain unicorns that already exist in that
&gt; mythology.
&gt; I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer,
&gt; say) without
&gt; thereby bringing them into existence. But "I
&gt; photographed
&gt; two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns",
&gt; entails that
&gt; the photographees exists in the same world as
&gt; the one in
&gt; which I took the photo.
  i.e. the one in which the things photographed
exist (cf. eating unicorns and other kinds of
physical interactions -- being run down by one
say).  *** is coming up again.
 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; I think that unless the grammar is to
&gt; impose an ontology,
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; that distinction can't be made with
&gt; gadri. One way to make
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it is through prediacates: "is a subkind
&gt; of", "is an instance
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; of"
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I understand your reasoning, but "lo
&gt; instance of lo mikce"
&gt; &gt; &gt; would not guarantee that we are referring
&gt; to actual instances;
&gt; &gt; &gt; we could be referring to imaginable
&gt; instances. That's why
&gt; &gt; &gt; I can't see how to do it without involving
&gt; gadri. (More
&gt; &gt; &gt; precisely, I can't see how to do it without
&gt; having a way
&gt; &gt; &gt; to distinguish quantification over subkinds
&gt; from quantification
&gt; &gt; &gt; over instances.)

  I look forward to seein how this turns out to
be relevant. I don't see it now, unless you want
to sorta save Dr. Dr. by saying that what is
meant is  Dr. A-Certain-Kind-of-Doctor.  But that
helpeth not.

&gt; &gt; Would that require fixing the universe of
&gt; discourse
&gt; &gt; to the one set of referents we all agree are
&gt; true material
&gt; &gt; indivisible objects in the real meterial
&gt; world, irrespective
&gt; &gt; of context? I don't think that's desirable,
&gt; but I'm not sure
&gt; &gt; it's even possible. For some broda we may all
&gt; agree on what 
&gt; &gt; counts as a true individual concrete real
&gt; single broda for
&gt; &gt; any and all contexts, but for many broda we
&gt; won't, it will 
&gt; &gt; depend on context.
&gt; 
&gt; I opine that a proposition is claimed to be
&gt; true of some
&gt; particular world (-- and the universe of
&gt; discourse can
&gt; span many worlds). I further opine that it is
&gt; desirable to
&gt; have some way to indicate whether two
&gt; propositions (such as
&gt; "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true
&gt; of the same 
&gt; world (since there seems to me to be a pretty
&gt; patent
&gt; distinction in meaning).
&gt; 
&gt; I was about to explain what I meant by
&gt; "instances", in the
&gt; light of what I have just said, but I'll take
&gt; things slowly.
&gt; 
&gt; --And.
&gt; 
&gt; 
&gt; </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:02 UTC · Tiki post #3699 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">I see that my last attempt to send on the
original messages has not yet worked so here they
are again:

--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; The (present?) material world is not
&gt; especially favoured by the
&gt; &gt; &gt; _grammar_ as the universe of discourse,
&gt; although it is a very
&gt; &gt; &gt; frequent obvious choice in many contexts.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be able
&gt; to make unambiguous
&gt; &gt; claims to the effect that exactly two things
&gt; have the property of
&gt; &gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need them.
&gt; X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0
&gt; Sender: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org
&gt; Errors-to: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org
&gt; X-original-sender: jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar
&gt; Precedence: bulk
&gt; Reply-to: wikidiscuss-list@lojban.org
&gt; X-list: wikidiscuss
&gt; 
&gt; That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two
&gt; things have the 
&gt; property of being a doctor".
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; In other words,
&gt; &gt; that one can go out into the world in which
&gt; my needing occurs,
&gt; &gt; and find &amp; grab hold of these two individuals
&gt; that are doctors.
&gt; 
&gt; By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of
&gt; things that we may 
&gt; make reference to in a given discourse. In one
&gt; context, {lo mikce}
&gt; may have a single referent in the universe of
&gt; discourse, in other
&gt; contexts it may have more than one.  In any
&gt; context, 
&gt; {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two of
&gt; the referents of
&gt; {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the
&gt; universe of discourse)
&gt; are such that I need them. In that discourse, I
&gt; don't need any 
&gt; of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from all
&gt; the referents
&gt; in the universe of discourse).

This notion of "universe of discourse" is fraught
with practical difficulties e.g., are things in
the physical environment in the universe or not
and, if not, how can I then introduce them, or ,
if so, what is excluded?) but it also does not
solve the {mi nitcu lo mikce} problem, which is
about scope, not range: {mi nitcu lo mikce} does
not generally even entail (let alone be
equivalent to) {lo mikce zo'u mi nitcu my}, since
whatever doctor(s) we pick is not needed for
another would do as well.
 
&gt; &gt; For clarity, a second example: There is an
&gt; ambiguity in "I drew
&gt; &gt; two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate
&gt; two unicorns". How
&gt; &gt; can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted
&gt; to do so?
&gt; 
&gt; Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is
&gt; like "I took 
&gt; a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew
&gt; two unicorns"
&gt; that is like "I made two unicorns out of clay"?
&gt; maybe we can
&gt; distinguish them with different predicates:
&gt; 
&gt;   mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna
&gt;   I picture-created two unicorns. 
&gt; 
&gt;   mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna
&gt;   I picture-copy-made two unicorns.
&gt; 
&gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence, but
&gt; you can't
&gt; eat them into existence, so that would be the
&gt; difference
&gt; between those predicates. 

Category mistake.  Pictures of unicorns aren't
unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) -- see
the fronting problem again if nothing else. 
Presumably eating a unicorn requires a unicorn,
not just a representation of one (to speak
loosely).  This is usually just fussbudgetry, of
course, but it does sometimes make a difference
and, as a logical language (well, trying to be
one where possible), Lojban sould make the
necessary distinctions at the basic grammatical
level (where inferences are meant to be
transparent).
 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I think that unless the grammar is to
&gt; impose an ontology,
&gt; &gt; &gt; that distinction can't be made with gadri.
&gt; One way to make
&gt; &gt; &gt; it is through prediacates: "is a subkind
&gt; of", "is an instance
&gt; &gt; &gt; of"
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance
&gt; of lo mikce"
&gt; &gt; would not guarantee that we are referring to
&gt; actual instances;
&gt; &gt; we could be referring to imaginable
&gt; instances. That's why
&gt; &gt; I can't see how to do it without involving
&gt; gadri. (More
&gt; &gt; precisely, I can't see how to do it without
&gt; having a way
&gt; &gt; to distinguish quantification over subkinds
&gt; from quantification
&gt; &gt; over instances.)

And I can't see exactly what subkinds will do to
help the matter at all, unless {nitcu} is like
{sisku} in taking properties; but we usually say
it takes events.
 
&gt; Would that require fixing the universe of
&gt; discourse
&gt; to the one set of referents we all agree are
&gt; true material
&gt; indivisible objects in the real meterial world,
&gt; irrespective
&gt; of context? I don't think that's desirable, but
&gt; I'm not sure
&gt; it's even possible. For some broda we may all
&gt; agree on what 
&gt; counts as a true individual concrete real
&gt; single broda for
&gt; any and all contexts, but for many broda we
&gt; won't, it will 
&gt; depend on context.

I have to agree with xorxes here (as often), but
I don't see how this helps matters at all.


--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; --- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; This notion of "universe of discourse" is
&gt; fraught
&gt; &gt; with practical difficulties e.g., are things
&gt; in
&gt; &gt; the physical environment in the universe or
&gt; not
&gt; 
&gt; In some contexts they are, in other contexts
&gt; they 
&gt; are not.
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; and, if not, how can I then introduce them, 
&gt; 
&gt; Mentioning something immediately introduces it
&gt; into the discourse.

But, in order to mention it and thus bring it
into the universe, it has to be somewhere already
(in some sense).  In particular, suppose I say
"some cows" or "there are cows that," what cows
have introduced?  the ones that satisfy the rest
of the sentence?  But the rest of the sentence
comes after the introduction -- the cows have to
be there in order to go on. And what if I am
wrong? I have introduced cows apparently but none
of them have the properties involved. So, maybe
by mentioning cows I introduce the lot of them. 
But then, what is excluded -- I mentioned
physical objects too, so are all of them in or is
it specific?
I suspect this is all terminological, that
"universe of discourse" here means something more
restricted than usual (what has actually been
mentioned and perhaps what is going to be
mentioned in the foreseeable future, abstracted
from the broader notion of, say, the range of
quantifiers or the like).  A smidge of
clarification might be handy here -- and maybe
some new terminology as well.
 
&gt; &gt;or ,
&gt; &gt; if so, what is excluded?)
&gt; 
&gt; There is no general answer. When I say that
&gt; there
&gt; is nothing in the box, air molecules are
&gt; normally
&gt; excluded from the universe of discourse, but
&gt; once 
&gt; I mention them, we have to admit that there is 
&gt; something in the box after all.

I didn't ask for a general answer in the sense of
a list of allthe things that are always in the
universe of discourse, only criteria for deciding
whjat is in and what is not.  Obviously
everything tha has been mentioned explicitly is
in.  Almost as obviously, some other things,
implicit in what has been said or about to be
mentioned, are also in, but what are the limits
-- by rule, not by list
..   
&gt; &gt; but it also does not
&gt; &gt; solve the {mi nitcu lo mikce} problem, which
&gt; is
&gt; &gt; about scope, not range: {mi nitcu lo mikce}
&gt; does
&gt; &gt; not generally even entail (let alone be
&gt; &gt; equivalent to) {lo mikce zo'u mi nitcu my},
&gt; since
&gt; &gt; whatever doctor(s) we pick is not needed for
&gt; &gt; another would do as well.
&gt; 
&gt; In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of
&gt; discourse 
&gt; contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for those
&gt; who don't mind that picture. If you can't
&gt; picture
&gt; doctors as just doctors, and you necessarily
&gt; must 
&gt; picture them as an aggregate of many individual
&gt; 
&gt; doctors, each considered separately, then you
&gt; must
&gt; take another course, for example (mi nitcu lo
&gt; nu
&gt; da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats me"
&gt; or 
&gt; something like that. Here you are picturing all
&gt; 
&gt; {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr
&gt; Someone-Treats-Me"
&gt; that you need, but some people mind doing this 
&gt; abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" 
&gt; abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to
&gt; abstract 
&gt; than people.

Ah, the history of Philosophy: those who ignore
it are doomed to repeat it.  This is the kind of
metaphysical argle-bargle created by not paying
attenmtion to logic (or being to lazy to use it).
 There is no Mr. Doctor (shouldn't that be "Dr.
Doctor"?) and if there were, he would be of no
help in satisfying a person's needs.  Only a real
concrete doctor will do that, and further one who
is in the appropriate relation to the needer --
treating him, say.  The fact that we cannot
identify beforehand who that doctor is, indeed
that the need is indifferent to that issue, does
not mean that there is an indifferent doctor who
is needed or an unidentified one.  It only means
that the quantifier involved is within the scope
of the needing.
As for Mr. abstractions just being a variant of
event abstractions (and sometimes property or
truth function or... abstractions), the Lojban
answer is simply NO.  The event, property, and so
on abstractions are inherent in Lojban; the Mr.
abstractions -- assuming that it could be given
some meaningful interpretation (and all serious
attempts at this have failed so far) -- is a new
thing, not already provided for.  That it is
being used to hi-jack an existing construction,
which had a perfectly good but different meaning,
does not mean that it was laready in Lojban.  It
is a foreign import and needs to be marked as
such.
  
&gt; &gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence,
&gt; but
&gt; &gt; &gt; you can't
&gt; &gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; &gt; difference
&gt; &gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Category mistake.  Pictures of unicorns
&gt; aren't
&gt; &gt; unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) --
&gt; see
&gt; &gt; the fronting problem again if nothing else. 
&gt; 
&gt; That seems like an ontology issue. Are
&gt; teddy-bears bears? 
&gt; CLL says they are, if I recall corrrectly. I
&gt; say it depends 
&gt; on the context (maybe that's what CLL says
&gt; too). The same 
&gt; with pictures of unicorns. I don't think there
&gt; needs to be a 
&gt; special gadri to sort teddy-bears from more
&gt; central bears,
&gt; or drawn unicorns from clay unicorns from
&gt; flesh-and-blood
&gt; unicorns.

I agree, this is not a gadri issue -- unless you
want to use the "what I am calling" aspect of
{le} to deal with the eccentric cases.  You
might, of course, say it is a brivla issue: what
exactly does a certain predicate mean (I take it
that this is the solution proposed for teddy
bears).  So, if {pavyseljirna} refers simply to a
shape (as Kung Sun Lung would have us believe)
then painting a picture of a unicorn presents no
problem: there is the unicorn I painted a picture
of, namely the shape of the picture itself.  This
of course makes for some very strange aesthetics:
it become hard to define realism, for example, or
portraiture in particular.  And it is rarely what
we mean.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:02 UTC · Tiki post #3700 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- 2 = 3 &lt;xod@thestonecutters.net&gt; wrote:

&gt; John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; 
&gt; &gt;[Sigh!]
&gt; &gt;  
&gt; &gt;
&gt; 
&gt; Why has the new proposal been met with
&gt; universal acceptance, even by the 
&gt; esteemed Dr. Rosta?
&gt; 
&gt; Why have you failed to offer an alternative
&gt; proposal lacking in the 
&gt; perceived defects, or succeeded in defending
&gt; the previous system as it was?

Incidentally, as a rule of rhetoric, I don't have
to defend the status quo, the other side has to
show good reasons for changing.  They have not
shown any reasons for changing so far as I can
tell -- largely because they have not explained
what the changes are.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-13 18:03 UTC · Tiki post #3701 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">pc:
&gt; &gt; &gt; I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance
&gt; &gt; of lo mikce"
&gt; &gt; &gt; would not guarantee that we are referring to
&gt; &gt; actual instances;
&gt; &gt; &gt; we could be referring to imaginable
&gt; &gt; instances. That's why
&gt; &gt; &gt; I can't see how to do it without involving
&gt; &gt; gadri. (More
&gt; &gt; &gt; precisely, I can't see how to do it without
&gt; &gt; having a way
&gt; &gt; &gt; to distinguish quantification over subkinds
&gt; &gt; from quantification
&gt; &gt; &gt; over instances.)
&gt; 
&gt; And I can't see exactly what subkinds will do to
&gt; help the matter at all, unless {nitcu} is like
&gt; {sisku} in taking properties; but we usually say
&gt; it takes events.

I'll issue a promissory note stating that if and only
if it becomes helpful to do so, I'll explain what I meant.

In the meantime, though, I think my most helpful
contribution is to limit myself to asking "How does 
one express such and such a meaning?".

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-13 18:03 UTC · Tiki post #3702 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">And:
&gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; And: 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous
&gt; &gt; &gt; claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of
&gt; &gt; &gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need them.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the 
&gt; &gt; property of being a doctor".
&gt; 
&gt; I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? So that is not
&gt; synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a neutral question.)

They are synonymous as far as I can tell.
Also {re se nitcu be mi cu mikce}, although the focus is
different in all three.

I think I misunderstood what you meant by "in the world in which 
I need them". {da} can take any value from the universe of discourse,
not just those things that exist in the world. To restrict to those,
we would need something like {da poi zasti le munje}. There is no
gadri that automatically imposes the restriction {poi zasti le munje}. 

.... 
&gt; I understand this -- the universe of discourse can simultaneously
&gt; contain something that is a needer in World X but not necessarily
&gt; in World Y, and something that is a doctor in World Y but not 
&gt; necessarily in World X.
&gt; 
&gt; But what I'm asking is how to say "something is such that in
&gt; one and the same world, I need it and it is a doctor".

How about: {mi nitcu lo mikce ku noi zasti mi}?
But that's the abnormal claim. In general it will be the case 
that: {mi nitcu lo mikce poi zasti mi ku}, because a doctor
that doesn't exist where I exist would not be much use. The
{poi zasti mi} clause need not be explicited because it
is usually obvious.

&gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't
&gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be the difference
&gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; 
&gt; That's not really the distinction I mean. Our local mythology
&gt; may contain unicorns that already exist in that mythology.
&gt; I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, say) without
&gt; thereby bringing them into existence. But "I photographed
&gt; two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", entails that
&gt; the photographees exists in the same world as the one in
&gt; which I took the photo.

I don't think that distinction is made with gadri.
{ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture
of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and
{ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} 
"that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in
our world".

&gt; I opine that a proposition is claimed to be true of some
&gt; particular world (-- and the universe of discourse can
&gt; span many worlds). I further opine that it is desirable to
&gt; have some way to indicate whether two propositions (such as
&gt; "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true of the same 
&gt; world (since there seems to me to be a pretty patent
&gt; distinction in meaning).

I don't know if Lojban is equipped to handle different worlds
in such detail. Other than {mu'ei} (that serves to quantify 
over worlds but not to refer to a particular world) we don't
have a lot of world machinery.

mu'o mi'e xorxes



	
		
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Yahoo! Mail - You care about security. So do we. 
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-13 18:03 UTC · Tiki post #3703 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; OK.  But it does have one off-putting
&gt; consequence:  The person who answers "What's in
&gt; the box?" with "Nothing" has given on xorxes'
&gt; view the right answer, there is nothing in the
&gt; universe of discourse in the box (I'm assuming
&gt; that air molecules have not been talked aobut
&gt; recently, since that would usually cue the
&gt; answerer to use them in the answer). 

Right.

&gt; Thus, the
&gt; response pointing to the air molecules in the box
&gt; (we do agree that they were there all the time
&gt; don't we?) is not an acceptable correction 

Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, many people rejoice
in making such corrections. It is not a nice correction (unless
for some reason it was important to consider air as a thing),
but once made, we have to deal with it. "There is nothing in the 
box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!", "Well, yes, but 
I meant that there's nothing but air in the box". 
 
&gt; (and
&gt; by the way bringing something from the universe
&gt; into the light) but a piece of Gricean dirty
&gt; pool, changing the game in mid stream.  Not a
&gt; move we ought to be recommending. 

It's a move that happens all the time. In what sense we
ought not recommend it?

&gt; &gt; No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some cows"
&gt; &gt; "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces cows.
&gt; &gt; {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo bakni}
&gt; &gt; and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni} to
&gt; &gt; have referents in the universe of discourse.
&gt; &gt; The quantifiers just quantify over those
&gt; &gt; referents,
&gt; &gt; they don't introduce them.
&gt; 
&gt; Were the cows there before or not? 

I have no idea, what's the context? If we are in a cow farm
the cows will probably be there from the start. In this 
discussion, there were no cows until we started talking
about them.

&gt; If not then
&gt; the use of the expression must introduce them, if
&gt; they were there already, where are the limits? I
&gt; pass over our differences about what "refers"
&gt; means.

I'm not sure what kind of limits you are talking about.
 
mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
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 </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:03 UTC · Tiki post #3705 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; And:
&gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; And: 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be
&gt; able to make unambiguous
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; claims to the effect that exactly two
&gt; things have the property of
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need
&gt; them.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two
&gt; things have the 
&gt; &gt; &gt; property of being a doctor".
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}?
&gt; So that is not
&gt; &gt; synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's
&gt; a neutral question.)
&gt; 
&gt; They are synonymous as far as I can tell.
&gt; Also {re se nitcu be mi cu mikce}, although the
&gt; focus is
&gt; different in all three.

That is, they are all pretty certainly false,
unless there are exactly two people (in the
universe of discourse)who collaboratively can
handle the problem I have.  But that changes the
meaning of at least {mi nitcu re mikce} as it
appears to have been intended (as an adequate
translation of "I need two doctors." 

&gt; I think I misunderstood what you meant by "in
&gt; the world in which 
&gt; I need them". {da} can take any value from the
&gt; universe of discourse,
&gt; not just those things that exist in the world.
&gt; To restrict to those,
&gt; we would need something like {da poi zasti le
&gt; munje}. There is no
&gt; gadri that automatically imposes the
&gt; restriction {poi zasti le munje}. 
 I assume that the quantifiers also do not impose
that restriction (a common one for quantifiers,
but not essential -- though having a quantifier
that does this is usually handy) 

&gt; &gt; I understand this -- the universe of
&gt; discourse can simultaneously
&gt; &gt; contain something that is a needer in World X
&gt; but not necessarily
&gt; &gt; in World Y, and something that is a doctor in
&gt; World Y but not 
&gt; &gt; necessarily in World X.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; But what I'm asking is how to say "something
&gt; is such that in
&gt; &gt; one and the same world, I need it and it is a
&gt; doctor".
&gt; 
&gt; How about: {mi nitcu lo mikce ku noi zasti mi}?
&gt; But that's the abnormal claim. In general it
&gt; will be the case 
&gt; that: {mi nitcu lo mikce poi zasti mi ku},
&gt; because a doctor
&gt; that doesn't exist where I exist would not be
&gt; much use. The
&gt; {poi zasti mi} clause need not be explicited
&gt; because it
&gt; is usually obvious.

But now the problem comes around again that this
claim is usually false, even though the
corresponding one in English might well be true.
There is no doctor in the relevant world that the
speaker needs -- another one would do as well.


&gt; &gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence,
&gt; but you can't
&gt; &gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be
&gt; the difference
&gt; &gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; That's not really the distinction I mean. Our
&gt; local mythology
&gt; &gt; may contain unicorns that already exist in
&gt; that mythology.
&gt; &gt; I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer,
&gt; say) without
&gt; &gt; thereby bringing them into existence. But "I
&gt; photographed
&gt; &gt; two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns",
&gt; entails that
&gt; &gt; the photographees exists in the same world as
&gt; the one in
&gt; &gt; which I took the photo.
&gt; 
&gt; I don't think that distinction is made with
&gt; gadri.
&gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu}
&gt; "that's a picture
&gt; of two unicorns which are mythological animals"
&gt; and
&gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le
&gt; ma'a munje} 
&gt; "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually
&gt; exist in
&gt; our world".

Aside from saying that pictures of unicorns are
unicorns -- as you seem to do sometimes -- I
agree with this: it is not a gadri issue.
 
&gt; &gt; I opine that a proposition is claimed to be
&gt; true of some
&gt; &gt; particular world (-- and the universe of
&gt; discourse can
&gt; &gt; span many worlds). I further opine that it is
&gt; desirable to
&gt; &gt; have some way to indicate whether two
&gt; propositions (such as
&gt; &gt; "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed
&gt; true of the same 
&gt; &gt; world (since there seems to me to be a pretty
&gt; patent
&gt; &gt; distinction in meaning).
&gt; 
&gt; I don't know if Lojban is equipped to handle
&gt; different worlds
&gt; in such detail. Other than {mu'ei} (that serves
&gt; to quantify 
&gt; over worlds but not to refer to a particular
&gt; world) we don't
&gt; have a lot of world machinery.

We can build it fairly easily with {munje} and
the like but I don't see the point here. 
Quantifiers in *** may be over different worlds
than covered in the rest of a sentence.  And that
is all that is needed for everything that has
turned up so far.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 18:03 UTC · Tiki post #3706 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; --- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; OK.  But it does have one off-putting
&gt; &gt; consequence:  The person who answers "What's
&gt; in
&gt; &gt; the box?" with "Nothing" has given on xorxes'
&gt; &gt; view the right answer, there is nothing in
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; universe of discourse in the box (I'm
&gt; assuming
&gt; &gt; that air molecules have not been talked aobut
&gt; &gt; recently, since that would usually cue the
&gt; &gt; answerer to use them in the answer). 
&gt; 
&gt; Right.
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; Thus, the
&gt; &gt; response pointing to the air molecules in the
&gt; box
&gt; &gt; (we do agree that they were there all the
&gt; time
&gt; &gt; don't we?) is not an acceptable correction 
&gt; 
&gt; Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, many
&gt; people rejoice
&gt; in making such corrections. It is not a nice
&gt; correction (unless
&gt; for some reason it was important to consider
&gt; air as a thing),
&gt; but once made, we have to deal with it. "There
&gt; is nothing in the 
&gt; box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!",
&gt; "Well, yes, but 
&gt; I meant that there's nothing but air in the
&gt; box". 

But on your view there was nothing at all in the
box, the air wasn't available to be there until
it was mentioned.  Unless something not mentioned
can  be in the universe, in which case, where the
limits? Why not allow the usual sort of universe,
since it is easier to deal with?


&gt; &gt; (and
&gt; &gt; by the way bringing something from the
&gt; universe
&gt; &gt; into the light) but a piece of Gricean dirty
&gt; &gt; pool, changing the game in mid stream.  Not a
&gt; &gt; move we ought to be recommending. 
&gt; 
&gt; It's a move that happens all the time. In what
&gt; sense we
&gt; ought not recommend it?

The fact that it happens all the time -- that is
that that verbal exchange occurs -- is evidence
that what is happening is not what you claim,
i.e. that the universe does not contain something
until it is mentioned. It is only under that
rubric that his action is condemned, so, since we
do not condemn it but even favor it, I take it
that your position is incorrect.

 
&gt; &gt; &gt; No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some
&gt; cows"
&gt; &gt; &gt; "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces
&gt; cows.
&gt; &gt; &gt; {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo
&gt; bakni}
&gt; &gt; &gt; and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni}
&gt; to
&gt; &gt; &gt; have referents in the universe of
&gt; discourse.
&gt; &gt; &gt; The quantifiers just quantify over those
&gt; &gt; &gt; referents,
&gt; &gt; &gt; they don't introduce them.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Were the cows there before or not? 
&gt; 
&gt; I have no idea, what's the context? If we are
&gt; in a cow farm
&gt; the cows will probably be there from the start.
&gt; In this 
&gt; discussion, there were no cows until we started
&gt; talking
&gt; about them.

How were they there on the cow farm if not yet
mentioned at the beginning of the conversation? 
I see that you are allowing that somethings other
than what are mentioned are in the universe, so
mentioning the first time them is sometimes not
introducing them.  But now why then do we ever
need to introduce something at all -- it may be
there alreeady and we just did not notice -- as
the cows were on the farm, say.
 
&gt; &gt; If not then
&gt; &gt; the use of the expression must introduce
&gt; them, if
&gt; &gt; they were there already, where are the
&gt; limits? I
&gt; &gt; pass over our differences about what "refers"
&gt; &gt; means.
&gt; 
&gt; I'm not sure what kind of limits you are
&gt; talking about.
&gt;  
If the universe contains some things that are not
mentioned in the conversation, how does this
differ from a universe given at the beginning
with only the referential relations being filled
in as the conversation proceeds?</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-13 22:11 UTC · Tiki post #3710 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; Thus, the
&gt; &gt; &gt; response pointing to the air molecules in the
&gt; &gt; box
&gt; &gt; &gt; (we do agree that they were there all the
&gt; &gt; time
&gt; &gt; &gt; don't we?) is not an acceptable correction 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, many
&gt; &gt; people rejoice
&gt; &gt; in making such corrections. It is not a nice
&gt; &gt; correction (unless
&gt; &gt; for some reason it was important to consider
&gt; &gt; air as a thing),
&gt; &gt; but once made, we have to deal with it. "There
&gt; &gt; is nothing in the 
&gt; &gt; box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!",
&gt; &gt; "Well, yes, but 
&gt; &gt; I meant that there's nothing but air in the
&gt; &gt; box". 
&gt; 
&gt; But on your view there was nothing at all in the
&gt; box, the air wasn't available to be there until
&gt; it was mentioned.  Unless something not mentioned
&gt; can  be in the universe, in which case, where the
&gt; limits? Why not allow the usual sort of universe,
&gt; since it is easier to deal with?

I'm lost as to what your objection is here. You seem
to be identifying the universe of discourse (a mathematical
set) with the physical universe (nothing like a mathematical
set). The air will always be in the physical universe 
whether we talk about it or not, or even whether we have
ever identified it or given it a name. 

&gt; The fact that it happens all the time -- that is
&gt; that that verbal exchange occurs -- is evidence
&gt; that what is happening is not what you claim,
&gt; i.e. that the universe does not contain something
&gt; until it is mentioned. 

I hope I never claimed such a thing about the universe!
But also not even about the universe of discourse. All I 
said was that if you mention it, then it is in the 
universe of discourse, not that if you don't mention it 
then it is not.

&gt; How were they there on the cow farm if not yet
&gt; mentioned at the beginning of the conversation? 
&gt; I see that you are allowing that somethings other
&gt; than what are mentioned are in the universe, so
&gt; mentioning the first time them is sometimes not
&gt; introducing them.  But now why then do we ever
&gt; need to introduce something at all -- it may be
&gt; there alreeady and we just did not notice -- as
&gt; the cows were on the farm, say.

Yes, so what's the point? I certainly don't have an
algorithm to list the things that are in the universe
of discourse for any discourse. Figuring that out
is a hard job of interpretation. If you get the
context wrong, you may completely misunderstand a
conversation, there is nothing new about that.
  
&gt; &gt; &gt; If not then
&gt; &gt; &gt; the use of the expression must introduce
&gt; &gt; them, if
&gt; &gt; &gt; they were there already, where are the
&gt; &gt; limits? I
&gt; &gt; &gt; pass over our differences about what "refers"
&gt; &gt; &gt; means.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I'm not sure what kind of limits you are
&gt; &gt; talking about.
&gt; &gt;  
&gt; If the universe contains some things that are not
&gt; mentioned in the conversation, how does this
&gt; differ from a universe given at the beginning
&gt; with only the referential relations being filled
&gt; in as the conversation proceeds?

One difference that occurs to me is that some things may be
incompatible to share a universe of discourse. But maybe not,
maybe that can be sorted out with appropriate sets of
referential relations.  

mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-13 22:12 UTC · Tiki post #3711 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">I have been raising this as a gadri issue only because
in an ancestral version of xorlo it was treated as such
and because that was the only solution I was ever
satisfied was satisfactory. But I'm not trying to
argue that xorlo needs to be altered. 

xorxes:
&gt; And:
&gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; And: 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; doctorhood in the world in which I need them.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the 
&gt; &gt; &gt; property of being a doctor".
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? So that is not
&gt; &gt; synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a neutral question.)
&gt; 
&gt; They are synonymous as far as I can tell.
&gt; Also {re se nitcu be mi cu mikce}, although the focus is
&gt; different in all three.
&gt; 
&gt; I think I misunderstood what you meant by "in the world in which 
&gt; I need them". {da} can take any value from the universe of discourse,
&gt; not just those things that exist in the world. To restrict to those,
&gt; we would need something like {da poi zasti le munje}. There is no
&gt; gadri that automatically imposes the restriction {poi zasti le munje}. 

Yes, you'd misunderstood me.

&gt; &gt; I understand this -- the universe of discourse can simultaneously
&gt; &gt; contain something that is a needer in World X but not necessarily
&gt; &gt; in World Y, and something that is a doctor in World Y but not 
&gt; &gt; necessarily in World X.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; But what I'm asking is how to say "something is such that in
&gt; &gt; one and the same world, I need it and it is a doctor".
&gt; 
&gt; How about: {mi nitcu lo mikce ku noi zasti mi}?
&gt; But that's the abnormal claim. In general it will be the case 
&gt; that: {mi nitcu lo mikce poi zasti mi ku}, because a doctor
&gt; that doesn't exist where I exist would not be much use. The
&gt; {poi zasti mi} clause need not be explicited because it
&gt; is usually obvious.

I think this might work, except that there remains an ambiguity.
Suppose there are two statues of unicorns in front of me, and I 
draw them, and say "ta pixra re pavyseljirna ku noi zasti ta":
that would be true, because the two drawees do exist in the
same world as ta, even though in ta's world they aren't
unicorns (-- they're statues). So we'd also want a way to
express whether the drawees are unicorns in ta's world.

&gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't
&gt; &gt; &gt; eat them into existence, so that would be the difference
&gt; &gt; &gt; between those predicates. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; That's not really the distinction I mean. Our local mythology
&gt; &gt; may contain unicorns that already exist in that mythology.
&gt; &gt; I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, say) without
&gt; &gt; thereby bringing them into existence. But "I photographed
&gt; &gt; two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", entails that
&gt; &gt; the photographees exists in the same world as the one in
&gt; &gt; which I took the photo.
&gt; 
&gt; I don't think that distinction is made with gadri.
&gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture
&gt; of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and
&gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} 
&gt; "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in
&gt; our world".

The first seems okay, but the second doesn't, for two
reasons. Firstly, one can have imaginary things that are defined 
as existing in the real world: "lo ca'a zasti le ma'a munje"
needn't refer to something that exists in the real world;
it might refer to "Mr Exister in the RW". Secondly, what
matters (with regard to disambiguation) is whether the
depictee exists in the same world as the depicter (and
whether the depictee has the property of being depicted
in the same world as it has the property of unicornhood).

&gt; &gt; I opine that a proposition is claimed to be true of some
&gt; &gt; particular world (-- and the universe of discourse can
&gt; &gt; span many worlds). I further opine that it is desirable to
&gt; &gt; have some way to indicate whether two propositions (such as
&gt; &gt; "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true of the same 
&gt; &gt; world (since there seems to me to be a pretty patent
&gt; &gt; distinction in meaning).
&gt; 
&gt; I don't know if Lojban is equipped to handle different worlds
&gt; in such detail. Other than {mu'ei} (that serves to quantify 
&gt; over worlds but not to refer to a particular world) we don't
&gt; have a lot of world machinery.

I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this overtly in
terms of different worlds. I am talking about different worlds
only as a means of explicating the different readings we
get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm suggesting that
Lojbanists might want a robust way to express the readings
distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-13 22:12 UTC · Tiki post #3713 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta wrote:
&gt; I have been raising this as a gadri issue only because
&gt; in an ancestral version of xorlo it was treated as such
&gt; and because that was the only solution I was ever
&gt; satisfied was satisfactory. But I'm not trying to
&gt; argue that xorlo needs to be altered. 

The way I understand it, xorlo hasn't changed much in the
aspect we are discussing (but it's possible I'm still
missing something). The only significant change from 
the old version has been the interpretation of the inner 
quantifier with respect to the outer one: in the old
version the inner quantifier was the numerosity of each
value that the quantified variable takes, in the current
version it is the total number of values the quantified
variable takes.

For example, {mi nitcu lo mikce} and {mi nitcu 
no lo mikce} are not compatible in either version. 

&gt; Suppose there are two statues of unicorns in front of me, and I 
&gt; draw them, and say "ta pixra re pavyseljirna ku noi zasti ta":
&gt; that would be true, because the two drawees do exist in the
&gt; same world as ta, even though in ta's world they aren't
&gt; unicorns (-- they're statues). So we'd also want a way to
&gt; express whether the drawees are unicorns in ta's world.

But that issue only arises if {ta pavyseljirna} has
two different readings. If we can say of the statue
that it is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue
is a picture of a unicorn. If we can't say that the
statue is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue
is not a picture of a unicorn. 

CLL says:

(The notion of a ``really existing, objectively defined bear'' raises certain
difficulties. Is a panda bear a ``real bear''? How about a teddy bear? In
general, the answer is ``yes''. Lojban gismu are defined as broadly as
possible, allowing tanru and lujvo to narrow down the definition. There
probably are no necessary and sufficient conditions for defining what is and
what is not a bear that can be pinned down with complete precision: the real
world is fuzzy. In borderline cases, ``le'' may communicate better than
``lo''.)

I would add that in different contexts the boundaries can 
be different. Once we decide whether in the given context
a statue of a unicorn counts as a unicorn, we know whether
the picture of the statue counts as a picture of a unicorn.

&gt; &gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture
&gt; &gt; of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and
&gt; &gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} 
&gt; &gt; "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in
&gt; &gt; our world".
&gt; 
&gt; The first seems okay, but the second doesn't, for two
&gt; reasons. Firstly, one can have imaginary things that are defined 
&gt; as existing in the real world: "lo ca'a zasti le ma'a munje"
&gt; needn't refer to something that exists in the real world;

This part I'm not sure I understand. Wouldn't an imaginary
(or fictional) thing be non-existent by definition?

&gt; it might refer to "Mr Exister in the RW". 

Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
it needs to do.

&gt; Secondly, what
&gt; matters (with regard to disambiguation) is whether the
&gt; depictee exists in the same world as the depicter (and
&gt; whether the depictee has the property of being depicted
&gt; in the same world as it has the property of unicornhood).

That would seem to require the marking of statements for
world of application, rather than the marking of sumti.

&gt; I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this overtly in
&gt; terms of different worlds. I am talking about different worlds
&gt; only as a means of explicating the different readings we
&gt; get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm suggesting that
&gt; Lojbanists might want a robust way to express the readings
&gt; distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?

How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version
according to you? 

mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 22:12 UTC · Tiki post #3715 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; --- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Thus, the
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; response pointing to the air molecules in
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; &gt; box
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; (we do agree that they were there all the
&gt; &gt; &gt; time
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; don't we?) is not an acceptable
&gt; correction 
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Well, in some cases it might be. In fact,
&gt; many
&gt; &gt; &gt; people rejoice
&gt; &gt; &gt; in making such corrections. It is not a
&gt; nice
&gt; &gt; &gt; correction (unless
&gt; &gt; &gt; for some reason it was important to
&gt; consider
&gt; &gt; &gt; air as a thing),
&gt; &gt; &gt; but once made, we have to deal with it.
&gt; "There
&gt; &gt; &gt; is nothing in the 
&gt; &gt; &gt; box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!",
&gt; &gt; &gt; "Well, yes, but 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I meant that there's nothing but air in the
&gt; &gt; &gt; box". 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; But on your view there was nothing at all in
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; box, the air wasn't available to be there
&gt; until
&gt; &gt; it was mentioned.  Unless something not
&gt; mentioned
&gt; &gt; can  be in the universe, in which case, where
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; limits? Why not allow the usual sort of
&gt; universe,
&gt; &gt; since it is easier to deal with?
&gt; 
&gt; I'm lost as to what your objection is here. You
&gt; seem
&gt; to be identifying the universe of discourse (a
&gt; mathematical
&gt; set) with the physical universe (nothing like a
&gt; mathematical
&gt; set). The air will always be in the physical
&gt; universe 
&gt; whether we talk about it or not, or even
&gt; whether we have
&gt; ever identified it or given it a name. 

The objection is (to repeat myself) that on your
view (things aren't in the universe until
mentioned) there was nothing in the box until the
air molecules were mentioned -- nothing that can
be brought up in the conversation, nothing in the
universe of discourse.  Far from confusing the
physical universe with the u/d, I am insisting on
the distinction and taking the u/d in your sense,
rather than some more common one.
 
&gt; &gt; The fact that it happens all the time -- that
&gt; is
&gt; &gt; that that verbal exchange occurs -- is
&gt; evidence
&gt; &gt; that what is happening is not what you claim,
&gt; &gt; i.e. that the universe does not contain
&gt; something
&gt; &gt; until it is mentioned. 
&gt; 
&gt; I hope I never claimed such a thing about the
&gt; universe!
&gt; But also not even about the universe of
&gt; discourse. All I 
&gt; said was that if you mention it, then it is in
&gt; the 
&gt; universe of discourse, not that if you don't
&gt; mention it 
&gt; then it is not.

You actually said that mentioning it the first
time *introduced* it into the universe of
discourse, whence I infer it was not there
before.  You may have *meant* something like "if
I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not
previously obvious that it was" or some such, but
it is hard to take your words in that sense.  
On the other hand, I am glad to see that your
sense of u/d is not hopelessly diffderent from a
normal pone, for all that its operations are put
rather strangely.To be sure, what is in the u/d
varies with context, but it takes a fairly
clearly specialized context to leave out gross
physical objects, even when most of them go
unmentioned.
 
&gt; &gt; How were they there on the cow farm if not
&gt; yet
&gt; &gt; mentioned at the beginning of the
&gt; conversation? 
&gt; &gt; I see that you are allowing that somethings
&gt; other
&gt; &gt; than what are mentioned are in the universe,
&gt; so
&gt; &gt; mentioning the first time them is sometimes
&gt; not
&gt; &gt; introducing them.  But now why then do we
&gt; ever
&gt; &gt; need to introduce something at all -- it may
&gt; be
&gt; &gt; there alreeady and we just did not notice --
&gt; as
&gt; &gt; the cows were on the farm, say.
&gt; 
&gt; Yes, so what's the point? I certainly don't
&gt; have an
&gt; algorithm to list the things that are in the
&gt; universe
&gt; of discourse for any discourse. Figuring that
&gt; out
&gt; is a hard job of interpretation. If you get the
&gt; context wrong, you may completely misunderstand
&gt; a
&gt; conversation, there is nothing new about that.

Well, the Gricean line is that the u/d must be
decided by the interaction of the interlocutors. 
If one of the participants wants it to be
crucially different from the (loosely defined, to
be sure) standard set (roughly gross physical
objects  and -- for Lojban -- all abstracta) then
he must make that difference overt at the
beginning.  Failing to do so is an offence in the
language game.  The air molecule guy is probably
at most weakly in violation, but maybe in
violation none the less -- even on the standrd
notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you
(only, apparently) seem to have been presenting.

&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; If not then
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; the use of the expression must introduce
&gt; &gt; &gt; them, if
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; they were there already, where are the
&gt; &gt; &gt; limits? I
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; pass over our differences about what
&gt; "refers"
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; means.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I'm not sure what kind of limits you are
&gt; &gt; &gt; talking about.
&gt; &gt; &gt;  
&gt; &gt; If the universe contains some things that are
&gt; not
&gt; &gt; mentioned in the conversation, how does this
&gt; &gt; differ from a universe given at the beginning
&gt; &gt; with only the referential relations being
&gt; filled
&gt; &gt; in as the conversation proceeds?
&gt; 
&gt; One difference that occurs to me is that some
&gt; things may be
&gt; incompatible to share a universe of discourse.
&gt; But maybe not,
&gt; maybe that can be sorted out with appropriate
&gt; sets of
&gt; referential relations.  

Huh?  There are some things that cannot both be
in a u/d.  This, assuming some moderate sense of
coherence is surely true (the irresistable force
and the immovable object are classic casses). 
But a u/d need not be coherent in this sense, so
that does not seem to be a real problem -- nor
one that is relevant to the point at issue.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-13 22:12 UTC · Tiki post #3716 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">&amp; says: 
&gt; I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this
&gt; overtly in
&gt; terms of different worlds. I am talking about
&gt; different worlds
&gt; only as a means of explicating the different
&gt; readings we
&gt; get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm
&gt; suggesting that
&gt; Lojbanists might want a robust way to express
&gt; the readings
&gt; distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?

I gather that the distinction is something like
this:  "I drew a picture of a unicorn" might mean
that a) there is a unicorn -- in the same world
as the one in which "I" refers to me and in which
I did this action of drawing a picture of it or
b) I drew a picture in this world which
represented  the salient visible properties
ascribed to unicorns and either 1) in some other
world there is a unicorn that this is an accurate
depiction of (or would be if it were in that
world) or 2) whether this is a depiction of some
real or not unicorn is irrelevant so long as this
does indeed display the relevant visual
prperties.  
The first seems to be covered by "There is a
unicorn and I painted a picture of it," if we
identify the u/d with a world, rather than
insisting on a physical restriction.  The third
is   in Lojban the standard dodge "I drew a
picture of 
the event/property/some relevant abstraction of
something being a unicorn" ("drew a picture of"
will need a careful definition in Lojban of
course).  The middle case is harder, since
presumably we want a quantifier of unicorns that
is clearly not in the world of the picture and
the picturer and most of the easy moves with
worlds (or without for that matter) don't
distinguish out the base world (the real is
possible).  Calling the unicorn mythical doesn't
do it since it is not in the world where it
exists.  Maybe the best move is to add the "which
exists in some situation other than this one" or
the like.  How do we make it clear that the
doctor we need is one in Chelm?</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xod · 2005-01-13 22:12 UTC · Tiki post #3717 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">John E Clifford wrote:

&gt;--- Jorge Llambas &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
&gt;wrote:
&gt;  
&gt;

&gt;&gt;I hope I never claimed such a thing about the
&gt;&gt;universe!
&gt;&gt;But also not even about the universe of
&gt;&gt;discourse. All I 
&gt;&gt;said was that if you mention it, then it is in
&gt;&gt;the 
&gt;&gt;universe of discourse, not that if you don't
&gt;&gt;mention it 
&gt;&gt;then it is not.
&gt;&gt;    
&gt;&gt;
&gt;
&gt;You actually said that mentioning it the first
&gt;time *introduced* it into the universe of
&gt;discourse, whence I infer it was not there
&gt;before.  You may have *meant* something like "if
&gt;I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not
&gt;previously obvious that it was" or some such, but
&gt;it is hard to take your words in that sense.  
&gt;  
&gt;

The only 'difference' between the two interpretations is the difference
between the item being newly introduced into the universe of discourse
at its first mention, and the item always having been in the universe of
discourse. But the interval in dispute starts at the beginning of the
discussion and ends at the item's first mention. Since the item is never
mentioned in the interval, this 'difference' is meaningless.



-- 
"The more you tighten your grip, Tarkin, the more star systems will slip 
through your fingers."</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-13 22:13 UTC · Tiki post #3718 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; The objection is (to repeat myself) that on your
&gt; view (things aren't in the universe until
&gt; mentioned)

Not my view at all.

&gt; You actually said that mentioning it the first
&gt; time *introduced* it into the universe of
&gt; discourse, whence I infer it was not there
&gt; before. 

If I recall correctly, you asked how things that
were not in the universe of discourse could
be introduced into it and I said one obvious 
way of doing that was to mention them. If my 
recollection is inaccurate, that's what I meant 
so hopefully we are now clear.

&gt; You may have *meant* something like "if
&gt; I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not
&gt; previously obvious that it was" or some such, but
&gt; it is hard to take your words in that sense. 

That's indeed what I meant.
 
&gt; On the other hand, I am glad to see that your
&gt; sense of u/d is not hopelessly diffderent from a
&gt; normal pone, for all that its operations are put
&gt; rather strangely.To be sure, what is in the u/d
&gt; varies with context, but it takes a fairly
&gt; clearly specialized context to leave out gross
&gt; physical objects, even when most of them go
&gt; unmentioned.

Really? I would think in most contexts most gross
physical objects are left out.

This is what dictionary.com has for "universe of
discourse":

universe of discourse
n. Logic 
A class containing all the entities referred to in a discourse or an argument.
Also called universe.

universe of discourse
n : everything stated or assumed in a given discussion [syn: universe]

Most things in the physical universe are not referred to
in most discourses or arguments, nor stated or assumed
in most discussions.

&gt; Well, the Gricean line is that the u/d must be
&gt; decided by the interaction of the interlocutors. 
&gt; If one of the participants wants it to be
&gt; crucially different from the (loosely defined, to
&gt; be sure) standard set (roughly gross physical
&gt; objects  and -- for Lojban -- all abstracta) then
&gt; he must make that difference overt at the
&gt; beginning. 

The standard set? There is a standard set of things
that Lojbanists are required to talk about? 

&gt; Failing to do so is an offence in the
&gt; language game.  The air molecule guy is probably
&gt; at most weakly in violation, but maybe in
&gt; violation none the less -- even on the standrd
&gt; notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you
&gt; (only, apparently) seem to have been presenting.

Which guy is in violation according to you, the
one that says the box doesn't contain anything or 
the one that points out that it contains air?
It seems to be a normal negotiation of the
universe of discourse.
 
mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
__________________________________ 
Do you Yahoo!? 
The all-new My Yahoo! - Get yours free! 
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 </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-13 22:13 UTC · Tiki post #3719 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">xorxes:
&gt; --- And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; I have been raising this as a gadri issue only because
&gt; &gt; in an ancestral version of xorlo it was treated as such
&gt; &gt; and because that was the only solution I was ever
&gt; &gt; satisfied was satisfactory. But I'm not trying to
&gt; &gt; argue that xorlo needs to be altered.
&gt;
&gt; The way I understand it, xorlo hasn't changed much in the
&gt; aspect we are discussing (but it's possible I'm still
&gt; missing something). The only significant change from
&gt; the old version has been the interpretation of the inner
&gt; quantifier with respect to the outer one: in the old
&gt; version the inner quantifier was the numerosity of each
&gt; value that the quantified variable takes, in the current
&gt; version it is the total number of values the quantified
&gt; variable takes.

The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
distinction, and (iii) there needed to be some way to
make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this
just in order to jog your memory &amp; explain where I'm coming
from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and
undermine xorlo.

&gt; &gt; Suppose there are two statues of unicorns in front of me, and I
&gt; &gt; draw them, and say "ta pixra re pavyseljirna ku noi zasti ta":
&gt; &gt; that would be true, because the two drawees do exist in the
&gt; &gt; same world as ta, even though in ta's world they aren't
&gt; &gt; unicorns (-- they're statues). So we'd also want a way to
&gt; &gt; express whether the drawees are unicorns in ta's world.
&gt;
&gt; But that issue only arises if {ta pavyseljirna} has
&gt; two different readings. If we can say of the statue
&gt; that it is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue
&gt; is a picture of a unicorn. If we can't say that the
&gt; statue is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue
&gt; is not a picture of a unicorn.
&gt;
&gt; CLL says:
&gt;
&gt; (The notion of a ``really existing, objectively defined bear'' raises
certain
&gt; difficulties. Is a panda bear a ``real bear''? How about a teddy bear? In
&gt; general, the answer is ``yes''. Lojban gismu are defined as broadly as
&gt; possible, allowing tanru and lujvo to narrow down the definition. There
&gt; probably are no necessary and sufficient conditions for defining what is
and
&gt; what is not a bear that can be pinned down with complete precision: the
real
&gt; world is fuzzy. In borderline cases, ``le'' may communicate better than
&gt; ``lo''.)
&gt;
&gt; I would add that in different contexts the boundaries can
&gt; be different. Once we decide whether in the given context
&gt; a statue of a unicorn counts as a unicorn, we know whether
&gt; the picture of the statue counts as a picture of a unicorn.

I think this is a red-herring. Even if a statue of Abraham Lincoln
is categorically not Abraham Lincoln, a picture of a statue of
Lincoln can be a picture of Lincoln, whereas a photo of statue
of Lincoln can't be a photo of Lincoln.

&gt; &gt; &gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture
&gt; &gt; &gt; of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and
&gt; &gt; &gt; {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje}
&gt; &gt; &gt; "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in
&gt; &gt; &gt; our world".
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; The first seems okay, but the second doesn't, for two
&gt; &gt; reasons. Firstly, one can have imaginary things that are defined
&gt; &gt; as existing in the real world: "lo ca'a zasti le ma'a munje"
&gt; &gt; needn't refer to something that exists in the real world;
&gt;
&gt; This part I'm not sure I understand. Wouldn't an imaginary
&gt; (or fictional) thing be non-existent by definition?

Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but
they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway,
my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our
local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not
a dog in our local real world.

&gt; &gt; it might refer to "Mr Exister in the RW".
&gt;
&gt; Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
&gt; it needs to do.

In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".

&gt; &gt; Secondly, what
&gt; &gt; matters (with regard to disambiguation) is whether the
&gt; &gt; depictee exists in the same world as the depicter (and
&gt; &gt; whether the depictee has the property of being depicted
&gt; &gt; in the same world as it has the property of unicornhood).
&gt;
&gt; That would seem to require the marking of statements for
&gt; world of application, rather than the marking of sumti.

That'd be one solution, yes.

&gt; &gt; I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this overtly in
&gt; &gt; terms of different worlds. I am talking about different worlds
&gt; &gt; only as a means of explicating the different readings we
&gt; &gt; get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm suggesting that
&gt; &gt; Lojbanists might want a robust way to express the readings
&gt; &gt; distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?
&gt;
&gt; How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version
&gt; according to you?

{lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of
{lo broda}. {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over
instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but
the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate
decisions about how LAhE worked. For certain sorts of
intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
readings, quantification would be over instances.

As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion
to that scheme.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-13 22:13 UTC · Tiki post #3720 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">pc:
&gt; &amp; says: 
&gt; &gt; I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this
&gt; &gt; overtly in
&gt; &gt; terms of different worlds. I am talking about
&gt; &gt; different worlds
&gt; &gt; only as a means of explicating the different
&gt; &gt; readings we
&gt; &gt; get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm
&gt; &gt; suggesting that
&gt; &gt; Lojbanists might want a robust way to express
&gt; &gt; the readings
&gt; &gt; distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?
&gt; 
&gt; I gather that the distinction is something like
&gt; this:  "I drew a picture of a unicorn" might mean
&gt; that a) there is a unicorn -- in the same world
&gt; as the one in which "I" refers to me and in which
&gt; I did this action of drawing a picture of it or
&gt; b) I drew a picture in this world which
&gt; represented  the salient visible properties
&gt; ascribed to unicorns and either 1) in some other
&gt; world there is a unicorn that this is an accurate
&gt; depiction of (or would be if it were in that
&gt; world) or 2) whether this is a depiction of some
&gt; real or not unicorn is irrelevant so long as this
&gt; does indeed display the relevant visual
&gt; prperties.  

Yes!

&gt; The first seems to be covered by "There is a
&gt; unicorn and I painted a picture of it," if we
&gt; identify the u/d with a world, rather than
&gt; insisting on a physical restriction.  

Yes, but there's no guarantee that the u/d is
identified with a world, so ideally there should
be a way to mark that explicitly,

&gt; The third
&gt; is   in Lojban the standard dodge "I drew a
&gt; picture of 
&gt; the event/property/some relevant abstraction of
&gt; something being a unicorn" ("drew a picture of"
&gt; will need a careful definition in Lojban of
&gt; course).  

Assuming that event abstractions don't have to be
events (i.e. don't have to fasnu). (That is indeed
the traditional Lojban position. I was never very
happy with it, but only because it seems, as you
say, to be a dodge.)

&gt; The middle case is harder, since
&gt; presumably we want a quantifier of unicorns that
&gt; is clearly not in the world of the picture and
&gt; the picturer and most of the easy moves with
&gt; worlds (or without for that matter) don't
&gt; distinguish out the base world (the real is
&gt; possible).  Calling the unicorn mythical doesn't
&gt; do it since it is not in the world where it
&gt; exists.  Maybe the best move is to add the "which
&gt; exists in some situation other than this one" or
&gt; the like.  How do we make it clear that the
&gt; doctor we need is one in Chelm?

I concur with your statement of the problem.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3721 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- 2 = 3 &lt;xod@thestonecutters.net&gt; wrote:

&gt; John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; 
&gt; &gt;--- Jorge Llambías
&gt; &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
&gt; &gt;wrote:
&gt; &gt;  
&gt; &gt;
&gt; 
&gt; &gt;&gt;I hope I never claimed such a thing about the
&gt; &gt;&gt;universe!
&gt; &gt;&gt;But also not even about the universe of
&gt; &gt;&gt;discourse. All I 
&gt; &gt;&gt;said was that if you mention it, then it is
&gt; in
&gt; &gt;&gt;the 
&gt; &gt;&gt;universe of discourse, not that if you don't
&gt; &gt;&gt;mention it 
&gt; &gt;&gt;then it is not.
&gt; &gt;&gt;    
&gt; &gt;&gt;
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt;You actually said that mentioning it the first
&gt; &gt;time *introduced* it into the universe of
&gt; &gt;discourse, whence I infer it was not there
&gt; &gt;before.  You may have *meant* something like
&gt; "if
&gt; &gt;I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not
&gt; &gt;previously obvious that it was" or some such,
&gt; but
&gt; &gt;it is hard to take your words in that sense.  
&gt; &gt;  
&gt; &gt;
&gt; 
&gt; The only 'difference' between the two
&gt; interpretations is the difference
&gt; between the item being newly introduced into
&gt; the universe of discourse
&gt; at its first mention, and the item always
&gt; having been in the universe of
&gt; discourse. But the interval in dispute starts
&gt; at the beginning of the
&gt; discussion and ends at the item's first
&gt; mention. Since the item is never
&gt; mentioned in the interval, this 'difference' is
&gt; meaningless.

Not in the "Nothing" / "Air units" (they aren't
molecules, after all) case  -- see the earlier
discussion. I take it that xorxes meant things in
a more usual sense and calls assigning as a
reference "introduction" or something very like
that. </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3722 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And:
&gt; The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
&gt; quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
&gt; to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
&gt; between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
&gt; over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
&gt; ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
&gt; distinction, 

Yes, and that remains so.

&gt; and (iii) there needed to be some way to
&gt; make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this
&gt; just in order to jog your memory &amp; explain where I'm coming
&gt; from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and
&gt; undermine xorlo.

I more or less remember it like that too. The BPFK has not voted
on LAhE yet. I don't suppose any of the existing LAhEs could be
recycled for this, but in principle new LAhEs with the meaning
{lo klesi be} and {lo mupli be} (or brivla with the appropriate
place structure) could be introduced.  

Would you agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
to the intensional issue? We have the two readings for the instance
case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
of doctor.

&gt; Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but
&gt; they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway,
&gt; my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our
&gt; local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not
&gt; a dog in our local real world.
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
&gt; &gt; it needs to do.
&gt; 
&gt; In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".

Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? You now seem to be
giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is 
his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
his time slices exist?

&gt; &gt; How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version
&gt; &gt; according to you?
&gt; 
&gt; {lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of
&gt; {lo broda}. 

If that means {lo broda cu zasti le ma'a munje} was generally 
false, then that's not my understanding of what {lo broda}
denoted. If brodakind generally exists in our world, then maybe
we are just using different words to say the same thing.

&gt; {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over
&gt; instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but
&gt; the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate
&gt; decisions about how LAhE worked.

That's my understanding of how it is for {PA lo broda}. LAhEs
are still open for discussion.

&gt; For certain sorts of
&gt; intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
&gt; places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
&gt; readings, quantification would be over instances.

I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
each instance separately. 

&gt; As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion
&gt; to that scheme.

I understand that. I agree there have been some changes with respect 
to the original scheme, but we disagree somewhat on what those changes 
have been.

mu'o mi'e xorxes




		
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Do you Yahoo!? 
Yahoo! Mail - Find what you need with new enhanced search.
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3723 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; --- John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; The objection is (to repeat myself) that on
&gt; your
&gt; &gt; view (things aren't in the universe until
&gt; &gt; mentioned)
&gt; 
&gt; Not my view at all.
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; You actually said that mentioning it the
&gt; first
&gt; &gt; time *introduced* it into the universe of
&gt; &gt; discourse, whence I infer it was not there
&gt; &gt; before. 
&gt; 
&gt; If I recall correctly, you asked how things
&gt; that
&gt; were not in the universe of discourse could
&gt; be introduced into it and I said one obvious 
&gt; way of doing that was to mention them. If my 
&gt; recollection is inaccurate, that's what I meant
&gt; 
&gt; so hopefully we are now clear.
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; You may have *meant* something like "if
&gt; &gt; I mention it then it is in the u/d even if
&gt; not
&gt; &gt; previously obvious that it was" or some such,
&gt; but
&gt; &gt; it is hard to take your words in that sense. 
&gt; 
&gt; That's indeed what I meant.
&gt;  
&gt; &gt; On the other hand, I am glad to see that your
&gt; &gt; sense of u/d is not hopelessly diffderent
&gt; from a
&gt; &gt; normal pone, for all that its operations are
&gt; put
&gt; &gt; rather strangely.To be sure, what is in the
&gt; u/d
&gt; &gt; varies with context, but it takes a fairly
&gt; &gt; clearly specialized context to leave out
&gt; gross
&gt; &gt; physical objects, even when most of them go
&gt; &gt; unmentioned.
&gt; 
&gt; Really? I would think in most contexts most
&gt; gross
&gt; physical objects are left out.

This one really is a non-different case: if they
are never mentioned, then it does not matter
whether they are in the universe or not.  For a
variety of reasons -- mainly that they might turn
up though you had not thought of that possibility
in advance -- a fairly wide sweep is commonly
used and the reference functions used assigned to
cover the cases that are mentioned (the other
cases dealt with in some arbitrary fashion --
within certain bounds, of course) 
&gt; This is what dictionary.com has for "universe
&gt; of
&gt; discourse":
&gt; 
&gt; universe of discourse
&gt; n. Logic 
&gt; A class containing all the entities referred to
&gt; in a discourse or an argument.
&gt; Also called universe.
&gt; 
&gt; universe of discourse
&gt; n : everything stated or assumed in a given
&gt; discussion [syn: universe]
&gt; 
&gt; Most things in the physical universe are not
&gt; referred to
&gt; in most discourses or arguments, nor stated or
&gt; assumed
&gt; in most discussions.

Well, that depends on what the quantifiers range
over.  Things that are never mentioned or
referred to may still (have to) be in the
universe to get the quantifiers working right in
some cases.  Maybe that is what "assumed" means
here.

&gt; &gt; Well, the Gricean line is that the u/d must
&gt; be
&gt; &gt; decided by the interaction of the
&gt; interlocutors. 
&gt; &gt; If one of the participants wants it to be
&gt; &gt; crucially different from the (loosely
&gt; defined, to
&gt; &gt; be sure) standard set (roughly gross physical
&gt; &gt; objects  and -- for Lojban -- all abstracta)
&gt; then
&gt; &gt; he must make that difference overt at the
&gt; &gt; beginning. 
&gt; 
&gt; The standard set? There is a standard set of
&gt; things
&gt; that Lojbanists are required to talk about? 

I didn't say you were re 
&gt; &gt; Failing to do so is an offence in the
&gt; &gt; language game.  The air molecule guy is
&gt; probably
&gt; &gt; at most weakly in violation, but maybe in
&gt; &gt; violation none the less -- even on the
&gt; standrd
&gt; &gt; notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you
&gt; &gt; (only, apparently) seem to have been
&gt; presenting.
&gt; 
&gt; Which guy is in violation according to you, the
&gt; one that says the box doesn't contain anything
&gt; or 
&gt; the one that points out that it contains air?
&gt; It seems to be a normal negotiation of the
&gt; universe of discourse.
&gt;  
&gt; mu'o mi'e xorxes
&gt; 
&gt; 
&gt; 
&gt; 		
&gt; __________________________________ 
&gt; Do you Yahoo!? 
&gt; The all-new My Yahoo! - Get yours free! 
&gt; http://my.yahoo.com 
&gt;  
&gt; 
&gt; 
&gt; 
&gt; </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3724 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">Button!  Does anyone know what the problem button
is that seems to get hit at various points when I
think I am doing normal stuff, like spacing or
paragraphing?

--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:


&gt; 
&gt; The standard set? There is a standard set of
&gt; things
&gt; that Lojbanists are required to talk about? 

I didn't say they were required to talk about
them, only that the objects were always available
if an occasion arose to mention them.  I suppose
that they are more precisely the objects in the
shared knowledge and beliefs of the conversants,
which presumably includes a large chunk of the
real world, though not all of it.  And may
include quite a few other things as well.

&gt; &gt; Failing to do so is an offence in the
&gt; &gt; language game.  The air molecule guy is
&gt; probably
&gt; &gt; at most weakly in violation, but maybe in
&gt; &gt; violation none the less -- even on the
&gt; standrd
&gt; &gt; notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you
&gt; &gt; (only, apparently) seem to have been
&gt; presenting.
&gt; 
&gt; Which guy is in violation according to you, the
&gt; one that says the box doesn't contain anything
&gt; or 
&gt; the one that points out that it contains air?
&gt; It seems to be a normal negotiation of the
&gt; universe of discourse.
&gt;  
As I understood your position originally, the one
who "points out" that it contains air, since that
constitutes changing the u/d in mid conversation.
In that context, the one who says there is
nothing in the box would be correct when he said
it, according to the u/d then in place.  In what
I now gather is your actual view, the move is
just a much less major shift, a pointing out of
what is going to be taken as relevant in the
conversation -- a continually negotiated part of
most conversations.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3725 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; Button!  Does anyone know what the problem button is that seems to
&gt; get hit at various points when I think I am doing normal stuff,
&gt; like spacing or paragraphing?

I assume that you've hit tab, which takes you to the next form
element, i.e. out of the writing area.

-Robin</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3726 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Robin Lee Powell
&lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:

&gt; On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, John
&gt; E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; Button!  Does anyone know what the problem
&gt; button is that seems to
&gt; &gt; get hit at various points when I think I am
&gt; doing normal stuff,
&gt; &gt; like spacing or paragraphing?
&gt; 
&gt; I assume that you've hit tab, which takes you
&gt; to the next form
&gt; element, i.e. out of the writing area.
&gt; 
&gt; -Robin

Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what happens
here (indeed, in the reply segment it doesn't do
anything).  It certainly does not send the reply.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-14 01:30 UTC · Tiki post #3727 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:17:49PM -0800, John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; 
&gt; --- Robin Lee Powell &lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; Button!  Does anyone know what the problem button is that
&gt; &gt; &gt; seems to get hit at various points when I think I am doing
&gt; &gt; &gt; normal stuff, like spacing or paragraphing?
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I assume that you've hit tab, which takes you to the next form
&gt; &gt; element, i.e. out of the writing area.
&gt; 
&gt; Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what happens here (indeed, in
&gt; the reply segment it doesn't do anything).  It certainly does not
&gt; send the reply.

No, but a tab followed by a return will.

In fact, a return by itself will probably do it.

-Robin</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-14 11:47 UTC · Tiki post #3736 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">xorxes:
&gt; --- And:
&gt; &gt; The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
&gt; &gt; quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
&gt; &gt; to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
&gt; &gt; between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
&gt; &gt; over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
&gt; &gt; ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
&gt; &gt; distinction, 
&gt; 
&gt; Yes, and that remains so.

Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification
over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that
in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or 
instances of a kind -- the distinction, if relevant, to be 
glorked. Correct me if I err.)
 
&gt; &gt; and (iii) there needed to be some way to
&gt; &gt; make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this
&gt; &gt; just in order to jog your memory &amp; explain where I'm coming
&gt; &gt; from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and
&gt; &gt; undermine xorlo.
&gt; 
&gt; I more or less remember it like that too. The BPFK has not voted
&gt; on LAhE yet. I don't suppose any of the existing LAhEs could be
&gt; recycled for this, but in principle new LAhEs with the meaning
&gt; {lo klesi be} and {lo mupli be} (or brivla with the appropriate
&gt; place structure) could be introduced.  

Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent
to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo}
reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.

&gt; Would you agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
&gt; to the intensional issue? 

Yes and no... 

&gt; We have the two readings for the instance
&gt; case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
&gt; of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
&gt; of doctor.

In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo
mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.

Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you &amp; me (at
least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification
(when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal
to pixra-type intensionals. 

But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the subkind/instance 
contrast but is not intensional.

&gt; &gt; Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but
&gt; &gt; they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway,
&gt; &gt; my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our
&gt; &gt; local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not
&gt; &gt; a dog in our local real world.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
&gt; &gt; &gt; it needs to do.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
&gt; 
&gt; Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? 

I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization,
but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic 
singularization.

&gt; You now seem to be
&gt; giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
&gt; I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is 
&gt; his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
&gt; his time slices exist?

Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has 
no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's 
manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.

In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else
to swallow it.

&gt; &gt; &gt; How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version
&gt; &gt; &gt; according to you?
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; {lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of
&gt; &gt; {lo broda}. 
&gt; 
&gt; If that means {lo broda cu zasti le ma'a munje} was generally 
&gt; false, then that's not my understanding of what {lo broda}
&gt; denoted. If brodakind generally exists in our world, then maybe
&gt; we are just using different words to say the same thing.

On my understanding, a brodakind, if it has instances that exist
in our world, itself exists in our world, in the sense of being
manifest in our world. But it also exists outside of our world,
too, in the noosphere along with the kinds (e.g. unicornkind)
that don't have instances that exist in our world.

&gt; &gt; {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over
&gt; &gt; instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but
&gt; &gt; the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate
&gt; &gt; decisions about how LAhE worked.
&gt; 
&gt; That's my understanding of how it is for {PA lo broda}. LAhEs
&gt; are still open for discussion.

Surely in xorlo {PA1 lo (PA2) broda} involves quantifying over
the (PA2) referents of {lo (PA2) broda}. 

If xorlo followed XS, then the inner PA in xorlo would make no 
sense. In XS, {pa lo re xirma} would be "two instances of Mr
Horse Pair" or "two subkinds of Mr Horse Pair" -- which admittedly
made lVi redundant. But if xorlo {pa lo xirma} can mean
"two instances/subkinds of Mr Horse", what on earth can
xorlo {pa lo re xirma} mean? There is only one Mr Horse.

So no, I think xorlo is pretty different from XS. 

&gt; &gt; For certain sorts of
&gt; &gt; intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
&gt; &gt; places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
&gt; &gt; readings, quantification would be over instances.
&gt; 
&gt; I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
&gt; with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
&gt; each instance separately. 

Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.

&gt; &gt; As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion
&gt; &gt; to that scheme.
&gt; 
&gt; I understand that. I agree there have been some changes with respect 
&gt; to the original scheme, but we disagree somewhat on what those changes 
&gt; have been.

Indeed!

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-14 13:47 UTC · Tiki post #3737 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And:
&gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; --- And:
&gt; &gt; &gt; The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
&gt; &gt; &gt; quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
&gt; &gt; &gt; to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
&gt; &gt; &gt; between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
&gt; &gt; &gt; over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
&gt; &gt; &gt; ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
&gt; &gt; &gt; distinction, 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Yes, and that remains so.
&gt; 
&gt; Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification
&gt; over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that
&gt; in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or 
&gt; instances of a kind -- the distinction, if relevant, to be 
&gt; glorked. Correct me if I err.)

That's correct. So in effect {PA lo broda} has the same
uses either way. 
  
&gt; Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent
&gt; to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo}
&gt; reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.

I think {lo klesi be} disambiguates one way (or eventually it 
shows there is a possible third reading, and then an infinite
series).  
 
&gt; &gt; We have the two readings for the instance
&gt; &gt; case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
&gt; &gt; of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
&gt; &gt; of doctor.
&gt; 
&gt; In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo
&gt; mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.

Yes, and now {su'o klesi be lo mikce} versus {lo klesi be lo mikce}.
 
&gt; Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
&gt; to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you &amp; me (at
&gt; least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification
&gt; (when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal
&gt; to pixra-type intensionals. 

I think the same possibilities exist for pixra:
a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith)
b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular)
c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist)
d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)
 
&gt; But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the subkind/instance 
&gt; contrast but is not intensional.

Yes, this is a better example to separate the two issues.

&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it needs to do.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? 
&gt; 
&gt; I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization,
&gt; but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic 
&gt; singularization.

OK. Where we disagree is that I don't want manifestation in the
world as a grammatical category. We can say of {lo broda} that
it mafifests itself in the world, or that it doesn't, or say 
nothing about that point (it may be irrelevant). 

&gt; &gt; You now seem to be
&gt; &gt; giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
&gt; &gt; I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is 
&gt; &gt; his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
&gt; &gt; his time slices exist?
&gt; 
&gt; Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has 
&gt; no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's 
&gt; manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.

"Exists" as in "can be included in the universe of discourse", 
"is a possible value for a variable", yes. "Exists" in the sense
"is manifest in the physical world", not necessarily (it may
or may not be). So I don't think we disagree on that.

&gt; In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else
&gt; to swallow it.

I enjoy ruminating different ontologies. :)

&gt; &gt; &gt; For certain sorts of
&gt; &gt; &gt; intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
&gt; &gt; &gt; places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
&gt; &gt; &gt; readings, quantification would be over instances.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
&gt; &gt; with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
&gt; &gt; each instance separately. 
&gt; 
&gt; Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.

All I meant is that you can make reference to Mr Broda without
making reference to its eventual instances of manifestation.

mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 22:44 UTC · Tiki post #3738 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Robin Lee Powell
&lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:

&gt; On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:17:49PM -0800, John
&gt; E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; --- Robin Lee Powell
&gt; &lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800,
&gt; John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Button!  Does anyone know what the
&gt; problem button is that
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; seems to get hit at various points when I
&gt; think I am doing
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; normal stuff, like spacing or
&gt; paragraphing?
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I assume that you've hit tab, which takes
&gt; you to the next form
&gt; &gt; &gt; element, i.e. out of the writing area.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what
&gt; happens here (indeed, in
&gt; &gt; the reply segment it doesn't do anything). 
&gt; It certainly does not
&gt; &gt; send the reply.
&gt; 
&gt; No, but a tab followed by a return will.
&gt; 
&gt; In fact, a return by itself will probably do
&gt; it.
&gt; 
&gt; -Robin
&gt; 
&gt; 
&gt; </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 22:44 UTC · Tiki post #3739 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Robin Lee Powell
&lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:

&gt; On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:17:49PM -0800, John
&gt; E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; --- Robin Lee Powell
&gt; &lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800,
&gt; John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Button!  Does anyone know what the
&gt; problem button is that
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; seems to get hit at various points when I
&gt; think I am doing
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; normal stuff, like spacing or
&gt; paragraphing?
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; I assume that you've hit tab, which takes
&gt; you to the next form
&gt; &gt; &gt; element, i.e. out of the writing area.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what
&gt; happens here (indeed, in
&gt; &gt; the reply segment it doesn't do anything). 
&gt; It certainly does not
&gt; &gt; send the reply.
&gt; 
&gt; No, but a tab followed by a return will.
&gt; 
&gt; In fact, a return by itself will probably do
&gt; it.

Thgank you; that does work  -- though I still
don't quite see how I manage to do it.  Return
alone does not work.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-14 22:44 UTC · Tiki post #3740 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">I either happily never saw the subclass ideas
about {Q lo broda} or blessedly have so
completely forgotten them that even this
discussion is not reviving any memories.  It
looks like a stage in the  illconceived
procession toward the xorlo reading of {Q1 lo Q2
broda) and should presumably be handled in the
corresponding way: with {lo klesi be lo broda}
like {lo Q2mei be lo broda}.

One vaguel encouraging thing in the discussion
was xorxes comment that Dr. Dr. is just doctors. 
This begins to sound like bunches, which Lojban
has always (though covertly) had.  Metaphysical
argle bargle aside, the only problem is that
bunches will not solve the intensionality
problem.  That leaves either admitting that {mi
nitcu lo mikce} is generally false -- if {nitcu}
is not a special predicate -- or that {nitcu2} is
an unmarked intensional context.  The latter is
of course a viable alternative (it works more or
less well in English, for example) but seems less
than optimal since Lojban has always had another
solution that works better and marks intensions
across the board.  There is also the fact that
{nitcu} 2 need not always be intensional, it need
not be in {mi nitcu leti mikce} (with appropriate
pointing if you insist)for example.

It is conceivable (though after how ever many
years it has been, conceiving is getting very
hard) that xorlo as it is now gradually emerging
in the expositions on the proposal given actually
solves some problem or presents some advantage
for the language.  I really would like to know
what you think this might be.  So far as the
present evidence goes, it is a defective fix for
a functioning system. </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-15 14:48 UTC · Tiki post #3748 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">xorxes:
&gt; --- And:
&gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; --- And:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; distinction,
&gt; &gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; Yes, and that remains so.
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification
&gt; &gt; over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that
&gt; &gt; in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or
&gt; &gt; instances of a kind -- the distinction, if relevant, to be
&gt; &gt; glorked. Correct me if I err.)
&gt;
&gt; That's correct. So in effect {PA lo broda} has the same
&gt; uses either way.

Yes.

&gt; &gt; Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent
&gt; &gt; to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo}
&gt; &gt; reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.
&gt;
&gt; I think {lo klesi be} disambiguates one way (or eventually it
&gt; shows there is a possible third reading, and then an infinite
&gt; series).
&gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; We have the two readings for the instance
&gt; &gt; &gt; case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind
&gt; &gt; &gt; of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind
&gt; &gt; &gt; of doctor.
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo
&gt; &gt; mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.
&gt;
&gt; Yes, and now {su'o klesi be lo mikce} versus {lo klesi be lo mikce}.

OK.

&gt; &gt; Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal
&gt; &gt; to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you &amp; me (at
&gt; &gt; least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification
&gt; &gt; (when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal
&gt; &gt; to pixra-type intensionals.
&gt;
&gt; I think the same possibilities exist for pixra:
&gt; a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith)
&gt; b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular)
&gt; c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist)
&gt; d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)

Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according
to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture. I understand
that the universe of discourse idea is supposed to do away with that
ambiguity, by including individuals from different worlds in one and
the same universe, and having quantification range over individuals
in the UoD. But there are good practical reasons for wanting to be
able to make the distinction if we choose to, since it -- the distinction
between real broda and imaginary broda -- is one we often make.

&gt; &gt; But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the
subkind/instance
&gt; &gt; contrast but is not intensional.
&gt;
&gt; Yes, this is a better example to separate the two issues.
&gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it needs to do.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
&gt; &gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view?
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization,
&gt; &gt; but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic
&gt; &gt; singularization.
&gt;
&gt; OK. Where we disagree is that I don't want manifestation in the
&gt; world as a grammatical category. We can say of {lo broda} that
&gt; it mafifests itself in the world, or that it doesn't, or say
&gt; nothing about that point (it may be irrelevant).

I don't necessarily want manifestation to be a grammatical category.
But I do want a way to determine truth-conditions, specifically in
determining which world a proposition is claimed to be true of.

It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe
that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that
all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and
the same world. That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa
-detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even
when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a
literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an
ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I
do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the
old-style meaning too.

&gt; &gt; &gt; You now seem to be
&gt; &gt; &gt; giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances.
&gt; &gt; &gt; I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is
&gt; &gt; &gt; his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where
&gt; &gt; &gt; his time slices exist?
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has
&gt; &gt; no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's
&gt; &gt; manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.
&gt;
&gt; "Exists" as in "can be included in the universe of discourse",
&gt; "is a possible value for a variable", yes. "Exists" in the sense
&gt; "is manifest in the physical world", not necessarily (it may
&gt; or may not be). So I don't think we disagree on that.

Right.

&gt; &gt; In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else
&gt; &gt; to swallow it.
&gt;
&gt; I enjoy ruminating different ontologies. :)
&gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; For certain sorts of
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; readings, quantification would be over instances.
&gt; &gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; &gt; I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
&gt; &gt; &gt; with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
&gt; &gt; &gt; each instance separately.
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.
&gt;
&gt; All I meant is that you can make reference to Mr Broda without
&gt; making reference to its eventual instances of manifestation.

OK.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-15 14:48 UTC · Tiki post #3749 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And:
&gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; I think the same possibilities exist for pixra:
&gt; &gt; a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith)
&gt; &gt; b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular)
&gt; &gt; c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist)
&gt; &gt; d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)
&gt; 
&gt; Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according
&gt; to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture. 

In that case, all four of them could be ambiguous that way. That's 
a third axis of distinctions.

&gt; It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe
&gt; that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that
&gt; all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and
&gt; the same world. 

I don't dispute there was a tendency (and maybe there still is)
to do that, but surely it could never have been absolute
because some predicates (like xanri) require their arguments to 
exist in different worlds. 

&gt; That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa
&gt; -detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even
&gt; when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a
&gt; literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an
&gt; ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I
&gt; do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the
&gt; old-style meaning too.

We don't impose any ontology on Lojban. Speakers are free to use 
the language in such a way that they only refer to non-fictional
things if they so wish.
 
mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
__________________________________ 
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Take Yahoo! Mail with you! Get it on your mobile phone. 
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=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-15 17:55 UTC · Tiki post #3750 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">xorxes:
&gt; --- And:
&gt; &gt; xorxes:
&gt; &gt; &gt; I think the same possibilities exist for pixra:
&gt; &gt; &gt; a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith)
&gt; &gt; &gt; b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular)
&gt; &gt; &gt; c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist)
&gt; &gt; &gt; d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according
&gt; &gt; to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture. 
&gt; 
&gt; In that case, all four of them could be ambiguous that way. That's 
&gt; a third axis of distinctions.
&gt; 
&gt; &gt; It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe
&gt; &gt; that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that
&gt; &gt; all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and
&gt; &gt; the same world. 
&gt; 
&gt; I don't dispute there was a tendency (and maybe there still is)
&gt; to do that, but surely it could never have been absolute
&gt; because some predicates (like xanri) require their arguments to 
&gt; exist in different worlds. 

{da xanri mi} and {su'o crida xanri mi} are unproblematic, because
{da xanri mi} and {da crida} are still true of the local real world
(because the truthconditions of xanri and crida include "in a
world other than the local real one"). ({su'o gerku cu xanri mi} would 
have fallen into the same problematic category as we are discussing 
here.)

The same goes for (c): the claim that there is a kind of doctor
(and I drew it) can be true of this world even if that kind is
not manifest in this world; at least, that is so under my
ontology... As for (b) &amp; (d), they don't claim that something is 
a doctor or a kind of doctor, so they don't share (a)'s ambiguity. 
So I maintain that only (a) is significantly ambiguous.

Incidentally, in my interpretation of XS, the reading of (a) where
Dr Smith is not necessarily a doctor in this world was not distinct
from (c). So there were four readings, (a-d), but (a) (if
expressed as {su'o mikce}) would unambiguously mean that 
the drawee is a doctor in this world.

However, I don't necessarily deny that the ambiguity of (a) 
operates on a different axis. Certainly that seems to be so
under xorlo.
 
&gt; &gt; That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa
&gt; &gt; -detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even
&gt; &gt; when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a
&gt; &gt; literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an
&gt; &gt; ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I
&gt; &gt; do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the
&gt; &gt; old-style meaning too.
&gt; 
&gt; We don't impose any ontology on Lojban. 

That's debatable, since some ontology is hardwired into sny
semantics. But be that as it may, the question I'm asking
concerns how to express things in the old-style ontology.

&gt; Speakers are free to use the language in such a way that they 
&gt; only refer to non-fictional things if they so wish.

The issue doesn't have to do with referring to only 
nonfictional things; it has to do with making it clear
what is and isn't claimed to be true of the local real
world. Normal discourse, including fictional discourse (e.g.
novels), makes a distinction between propositions that are
claimed to be true of the local real world and propositions
that aren't. So, for instances, the truthconditions of
{da gerku}, given that gerku are by definition real (in
the world in which they gerku), are such that one evaluates
them by checking through the local real world to see if
it contains something that has doghood.

Consider English "There is at least one cure for AIDS, and 
we discussed it". That entails or very very strongly
implicates that one can go out into the world and find
at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at least one
cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure is 
necessarily real. So the two English sentences seem not 
to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents are 
synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We discussed 
at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how to render 
in Lojban the English "There is at least one AIDS cure, 
and we discussed it".

To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I 
am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a
way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, 
and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would
like Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that
xorlo happens not to provide it.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-15 17:55 UTC · Tiki post #3751 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Jorge Llambías &lt;jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; --- And:

&gt; 
&gt; &gt; It may sound like I am introducing a wholly
&gt; new idea, but I believe
&gt; &gt; that the general lojbanological understanding
&gt; was, implicitly, that
&gt; &gt; all propositions in a clause were claimed to
&gt; be true of one and
&gt; &gt; the same world. 
&gt; 
&gt; I don't dispute there was a tendency (and maybe
&gt; there still is)
&gt; to do that, but surely it could never have been
&gt; absolute
&gt; because some predicates (like xanri) require
&gt; their arguments to 
&gt; exist in different worlds. 


This is one of the reasons for suggesting that
{xanri1} is intensional or (better) that the
preferred sumti is an abstractum.  Of course,
this does not require that the referent is not in
the current world -- the sentence may be false
after all or about someone, in (xanri2}, who
imagines something that is in fact real.

&gt; &gt; That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra
&gt; pa
&gt; &gt; -detective} can now describe a depiction of
&gt; Sherlock Holmes, even
&gt; &gt; when it is mutually manifest in the context
&gt; that Holmes is a
&gt; &gt; literary fiction. I think therefore that
&gt; there has been an
&gt; &gt; ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't
&gt; object to it, but I
&gt; &gt; do think there ought to be a way of
&gt; expressing things with the
&gt; &gt; old-style meaning too.
&gt; 
&gt; We don't impose any ontology on Lojban.
&gt; Speakers are free to use 
&gt; the language in such a way that they only refer
&gt; to non-fictional
&gt; things if they so wish.

We don't impose an ontology on Lojban, but the
facts of the case do have some relevance (impose
an ontology -- although that is not quite the
right word, so we take it in the Lojban sense)
and we should be prepared to deal with it.  If we
can get to a thing only by passing through
someone's thought processes, it should be
distinguished from something we can get to by
walking around.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-15 17:55 UTC · Tiki post #3752 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:


&gt; Consider English "There is at least one cure
&gt; for AIDS, and 
&gt; we discussed it". That entails or very very
&gt; strongly
&gt; implicates that one can go out into the world
&gt; and find
&gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at
&gt; least one
&gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure
&gt; is 
&gt; necessarily real. So the two English sentences
&gt; seem not 
&gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents
&gt; are 
&gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We
&gt; discussed 
&gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how
&gt; to render 
&gt; in Lojban the English "There is at least one
&gt; AIDS cure, 
&gt; and we discussed it".
&gt; 
&gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else
&gt; reading this), I 
&gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to
&gt; provide a
&gt; way of translating "There is at least one AIDS
&gt; cure, 
&gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that
&gt; one would
&gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating it,
&gt; and that
&gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.

What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be a
"fix" that destroys an unbroken system: 
{da [cure -- seems nearly impossible to say for a
material rather than a doctor] la aids ije mia
casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo [cure] be la
aids} (using the intensional object rather than
the intensional place method.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-15 17:55 UTC · Tiki post #3753 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- John E Clifford &lt;clifford-j@sbcglobal.net&gt;
wrote:

&gt; 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else
&gt; &gt; reading this), I 
&gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo*
&gt; to
&gt; &gt; provide a
&gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one
&gt; AIDS
&gt; &gt; cure, 
&gt; &gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that
&gt; &gt; one would
&gt; &gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating it,
&gt; &gt; and that
&gt; &gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.
&gt; 
&gt; What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be a
&gt; "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: 
&gt; {da [cure -- seems nearly impossible to say for
&gt; a
&gt; material rather than a doctor] la aids ije mia
&gt; casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo [cure] be la
&gt; aids} (using the intensional object rather than
&gt; the intensional place method.

{ka'orbixri'a} (fech!) "(using) x1 causes one
suffering from x2 to become healthy" "x1 is a
cure for x2"</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-16 01:16 UTC · Tiki post #3754 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">pc:
&gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; Consider English "There is at least one cure
&gt; &gt; for AIDS, and 
&gt; &gt; we discussed it". That entails or very very
&gt; &gt; strongly
&gt; &gt; implicates that one can go out into the world
&gt; &gt; and find
&gt; &gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at
&gt; &gt; least one
&gt; &gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure
&gt; &gt; is 
&gt; &gt; necessarily real. So the two English sentences
&gt; &gt; seem not 
&gt; &gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents
&gt; &gt; are 
&gt; &gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We
&gt; &gt; discussed 
&gt; &gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how
&gt; &gt; to render 
&gt; &gt; in Lojban the English "There is at least one
&gt; &gt; AIDS cure, 
&gt; &gt; and we discussed it".
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else
&gt; &gt; reading this), I 
&gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to
&gt; &gt; provide a
&gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one AIDS
&gt; &gt; cure, 
&gt; &gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that
&gt; &gt; one would
&gt; &gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating it,
&gt; &gt; and that
&gt; &gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.
&gt; 
&gt; What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be a
&gt; "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: 
&gt; {da [cure -- seems nearly impossible to say for a
&gt; material rather than a doctor] la aids ije mia
&gt; casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo [cure] be la
&gt; aids} (using the intensional object rather than
&gt; the intensional place method.

But we discuss the cure, not the abstraction. And
what would be the abstraction that tu'a abbreviates?
Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the discussee
does not necessarily exist (at least as a cure) in
the same world as the discussion?

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-16 01:17 UTC · Tiki post #3755 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:

&gt; pc:
&gt; &gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; Consider English "There is at least one
&gt; cure
&gt; &gt; &gt; for AIDS, and 
&gt; &gt; &gt; we discussed it". That entails or very very
&gt; &gt; &gt; strongly
&gt; &gt; &gt; implicates that one can go out into the
&gt; world
&gt; &gt; &gt; and find
&gt; &gt; &gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed
&gt; at
&gt; &gt; &gt; least one
&gt; &gt; &gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS
&gt; cure
&gt; &gt; &gt; is 
&gt; &gt; &gt; necessarily real. So the two English
&gt; sentences
&gt; &gt; &gt; seem not 
&gt; &gt; &gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban
&gt; equivalents
&gt; &gt; &gt; are 
&gt; &gt; &gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to English
&gt; "We
&gt; &gt; &gt; discussed 
&gt; &gt; &gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know
&gt; how
&gt; &gt; &gt; to render 
&gt; &gt; &gt; in Lojban the English "There is at least
&gt; one
&gt; &gt; &gt; AIDS cure, 
&gt; &gt; &gt; and we discussed it".
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else
&gt; &gt; &gt; reading this), I 
&gt; &gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo*
&gt; to
&gt; &gt; &gt; provide a
&gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one
&gt; AIDS
&gt; &gt; &gt; cure, 
&gt; &gt; &gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying
&gt; that
&gt; &gt; &gt; one would
&gt; &gt; &gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating
&gt; it,
&gt; &gt; &gt; and that
&gt; &gt; &gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be
&gt; a
&gt; &gt; "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: 
&gt; &gt; {da [cure -- seems nearly impossible to say
&gt; for a
&gt; &gt; material rather than a doctor] la aids ije
&gt; mia
&gt; &gt; casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo [cure] be la
&gt; &gt; aids} (using the intensional object rather
&gt; than
&gt; &gt; the intensional place method.
&gt; 
&gt; But we discuss the cure, not the abstraction.
&gt; And
&gt; what would be the abstraction that tu'a
&gt; abbreviates?
&gt; Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the
&gt; discussee
&gt; does not necessarily exist (at least as a cure)
&gt; in
&gt; the same world as the discussion?

Yes, it is not immediately clear which
abstraction to use.  I am inclined to think it is
usually events:  What we discuss is either
whether (or that) the cure exists or what it does
or how it does it.  Just discussing the cure tout
court is a little like needing just a doctor, not
a doctor doing something.  But in any case, it
does give a world creator to potentially distance
the object.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-17 00:54 UTC · Tiki post #3756 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">pc:
&gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; pc:
&gt; &gt; &gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Consider English "There is at least one
&gt; &gt; cure
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; for AIDS, and 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we discussed it". That entails or very very
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; strongly
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; implicates that one can go out into the
&gt; &gt; world
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and find
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed
&gt; &gt; at
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; least one
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS
&gt; &gt; cure
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; is 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; necessarily real. So the two English
&gt; &gt; sentences
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; seem not 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban
&gt; &gt; equivalents
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; are 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to English
&gt; &gt; "We
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; discussed 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know
&gt; &gt; how
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; to render 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; in Lojban the English "There is at least
&gt; &gt; one
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; AIDS cure, 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and we discussed it".
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; reading this), I 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo*
&gt; &gt; to
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; provide a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one
&gt; &gt; AIDS
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; cure, 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying
&gt; &gt; that
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; one would
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating
&gt; &gt; it,
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and that
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be
&gt; &gt; a
&gt; &gt; &gt; "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: 
&gt; &gt; &gt; {da [cure -- seems nearly impossible to say
&gt; &gt; for a
&gt; &gt; &gt; material rather than a doctor] la aids ije
&gt; &gt; mia
&gt; &gt; &gt; casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo [cure] be la
&gt; &gt; &gt; aids} (using the intensional object rather
&gt; &gt; than
&gt; &gt; &gt; the intensional place method.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; But we discuss the cure, not the abstraction.
&gt; &gt; And
&gt; &gt; what would be the abstraction that tu'a
&gt; &gt; abbreviates?
&gt; &gt; Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the
&gt; &gt; discussee
&gt; &gt; does not necessarily exist (at least as a cure)
&gt; &gt; in
&gt; &gt; the same world as the discussion?
&gt; 
&gt; Yes, it is not immediately clear which
&gt; abstraction to use.  I am inclined to think it is
&gt; usually events:  What we discuss is either
&gt; whether (or that) the cure exists or what it does
&gt; or how it does it.  Just discussing the cure tout
&gt; court is a little like needing just a doctor, not
&gt; a doctor doing something.  But in any case, it
&gt; does give a world creator to potentially distance
&gt; the object.

If this were so, it ought to be so also for cures
that do exist, for I think existing and nonexisting
cures can be discussed in the same way. So if tu'a
is required for not-necessarily-existing cures,
it should be required for necessarily-existing
ones too. 

Although I too at one time pushed for the sort of
solution you're advocating, it no longer rings
true for me (because the solution doesn't seem to
fit the actual meaning). Two solutions I can see
are: 
1. Words (probably tcita) meaning "exists in local 
real world" and "doesn't necessarily exist in local 
real world".
2. Something like the XS gadri proposal, where
there are two LAhE (or similar) such that PA LAhE1
lo broda quantifies over broda in the local real
world and PA LAhE2 quantifies over broda regardless
of whether they're in the local real world.

Solution (1) seems far less disruptive to xorlo
and hence to the progress and consensus that the
BPFK appears to have achieved.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-17 00:55 UTC · Tiki post #3757 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:

&gt; pc:
&gt; &gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; pc:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Consider English "There is at least one
&gt; &gt; &gt; cure
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; for AIDS, and 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we discussed it". That entails or very
&gt; very
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; strongly
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; implicates that one can go out into the
&gt; &gt; &gt; world
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and find
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We
&gt; discussed
&gt; &gt; &gt; at
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; least one
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the
&gt; AIDS
&gt; &gt; &gt; cure
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; is 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; necessarily real. So the two English
&gt; &gt; &gt; sentences
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; seem not 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban
&gt; &gt; &gt; equivalents
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; are 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to
&gt; English
&gt; &gt; &gt; "We
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; discussed 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to
&gt; know
&gt; &gt; &gt; how
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; to render 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; in Lojban the English "There is at
&gt; least
&gt; &gt; &gt; one
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; AIDS cure, 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and we discussed it".
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone
&gt; else
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; reading this), I 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of
&gt; *xorlo*
&gt; &gt; &gt; to
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; provide a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least
&gt; one
&gt; &gt; &gt; AIDS
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; cure, 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm
&gt; saying
&gt; &gt; &gt; that
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; one would
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; like Lojban to have a way of
&gt; translating
&gt; &gt; &gt; it,
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; and that
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to
&gt; be
&gt; &gt; &gt; a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; {da [cure -- seems nearly impossible to
&gt; say
&gt; &gt; &gt; for a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; material rather than a doctor] la aids
&gt; ije
&gt; &gt; &gt; mia
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo [cure]
&gt; be la
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; aids} (using the intensional object
&gt; rather
&gt; &gt; &gt; than
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; the intensional place method.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; But we discuss the cure, not the
&gt; abstraction.
&gt; &gt; &gt; And
&gt; &gt; &gt; what would be the abstraction that tu'a
&gt; &gt; &gt; abbreviates?
&gt; &gt; &gt; Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the
&gt; &gt; &gt; discussee
&gt; &gt; &gt; does not necessarily exist (at least as a
&gt; cure)
&gt; &gt; &gt; in
&gt; &gt; &gt; the same world as the discussion?
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Yes, it is not immediately clear which
&gt; &gt; abstraction to use.  I am inclined to think
&gt; it is
&gt; &gt; usually events:  What we discuss is either
&gt; &gt; whether (or that) the cure exists or what it
&gt; does
&gt; &gt; or how it does it.  Just discussing the cure
&gt; tout
&gt; &gt; court is a little like needing just a doctor,
&gt; not
&gt; &gt; a doctor doing something.  But in any case,
&gt; it
&gt; &gt; does give a world creator to potentially
&gt; distance
&gt; &gt; the object.

On further thought, it seems to me that the
abstraction involved is a proposition, which
provides all the advantages of events with the
addition that they can be questions overtly,
rather than covertly.  And, of course, discussion
is a linguistic activity.


&gt; If this were so, it ought to be so also for
&gt; cures
&gt; that do exist, for I think existing and
&gt; nonexisting
&gt; cures can be discussed in the same way. So if
&gt; tu'a
&gt; is required for not-necessarily-existing cures,
&gt; it should be required for necessarily-existing
&gt; ones too. 

While this is technically true, I don't see that
it needs to influence the language that much. 
{mi nitcu loti mikce} is merely an idiom for the
same with {tu'a} indicating that loti mikce
exists in the same world as the speaker.  (Some
aspects of this talk about what world the object
exists in seems to me to rest on a belief that
because the doctor who would fill my need would
have to be in the same world as I am the referent
of {lo mikce} has to be in this world.  But that
is clearly wrong since the filling of the need is
clearly subjunctive, that is I can have the need
even though nothing in the world fills it.)

&gt; Although I too at one time pushed for the sort
&gt; of
&gt; solution you're advocating, it no longer rings
&gt; true for me (because the solution doesn't seem
&gt; to
&gt; fit the actual meaning). Two solutions I can
&gt; see
&gt; are: 
&gt; 1. Words (probably tcita) meaning "exists in
&gt; local 
&gt; real world" and "doesn't necessarily exist in
&gt; local 
&gt; real world".
&gt; 2. Something like the XS gadri proposal, where
&gt; there are two LAhE (or similar) such that PA
&gt; LAhE1
&gt; lo broda quantifies over broda in the local
&gt; real
&gt; world and PA LAhE2 quantifies over broda
&gt; regardless
&gt; of whether they're in the local real world.
&gt; 
&gt; Solution (1) seems far less disruptive to xorlo
&gt; and hence to the progress and consensus that
&gt; the
&gt; BPFK appears to have achieved.

Since I think that xorlo -- even as it was
presented officially, before the expanding
explications -- is a disaster, preserving it is
hardly a considertation.  The predicate for
"exists in this world" ({zasti} + implications) 
and "exists in an unspecified world" ({zasti} +
explcit comments) seems to me to put the work in
the wrong place, as does the {LAhE} solution. 
They also complicates an already (in xorlo)
complicated situation for what is ultimately a
rather simple problem (several of them in fact),
for which the use of intensional expressions
provides a uniform solution within the present
system.  As I have noted, I have yet to see a
convincing case which requires any of the
mumbo-jumbo of xorlo or that would justify the
complications that that system (well, some
versions of it -- I hope one will get settled on
soon) entails.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-17 00:55 UTC · Tiki post #3760 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">pc:
&gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; Solution (1) seems far less disruptive to xorlo
&gt; &gt; and hence to the progress and consensus that
&gt; &gt; the
&gt; &gt; BPFK appears to have achieved.
&gt; 
&gt; Since I think that xorlo -- even as it was
&gt; presented officially, before the expanding
&gt; explications -- is a disaster, preserving it is
&gt; hardly a considertation.  

I had the impression (from the official xorlo
page) that xorlo had been discussed and then voted 
on by the BPFK with unanimous approval from those
voting. (--No small achievement if set against
the state of lojbanology when I tuned out!)

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-17 05:03 UTC · Tiki post #3761 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:

&gt; pc:
&gt; &gt; --- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; Solution (1) seems far less disruptive to
&gt; xorlo
&gt; &gt; &gt; and hence to the progress and consensus
&gt; that
&gt; &gt; &gt; the
&gt; &gt; &gt; BPFK appears to have achieved.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Since I think that xorlo -- even as it was
&gt; &gt; presented officially, before the expanding
&gt; &gt; explications -- is a disaster, preserving it
&gt; is
&gt; &gt; hardly a considertation.  
&gt; 
&gt; I had the impression (from the official xorlo
&gt; page) that xorlo had been discussed and then
&gt; voted 
&gt; on by the BPFK with unanimous approval from
&gt; those
&gt; voting. (--No small achievement if set against
&gt; the state of lojbanology when I tuned out!)

Even if you are correct (and there is some reason
to be doubtful about the discussion part of that)
that hardly makes it a Good Idea.  Consider the
recent US election after all.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-17 08:15 UTC · Tiki post #3762 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Sun, 2005-01-16 at 17:48 -0800, John E Clifford wrote:
&gt; Even if you are correct (and there is some reason
&gt; to be doubtful about the discussion part of that)
&gt; that hardly makes it a Good Idea.  Consider the
&gt; recent US election after all.

The recent US election was hardly unanimous.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-17 15:06 UTC · Tiki post #3763 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Theodore Reed &lt;treed@surreality.us&gt; wrote:

&gt; On Sun, 2005-01-16 at 17:48 -0800, John E
&gt; Clifford wrote:
&gt; &gt; Even if you are correct (and there is some
&gt; reason
&gt; &gt; to be doubtful about the discussion part of
&gt; that)
&gt; &gt; that hardly makes it a Good Idea.  Consider
&gt; the
&gt; &gt; recent US election after all.
&gt; 
&gt; The recent US election was hardly unanimous.
&gt; 
True, but it was not unaimously the other way
either; as Lincoln said ...</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''xorxes · 2005-01-19 15:46 UTC · Tiki post #3771 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And:
&gt; The issue doesn't have to do with referring to only 
&gt; nonfictional things; it has to do with making it clear
&gt; what is and isn't claimed to be true of the local real
&gt; world. Normal discourse, including fictional discourse (e.g.
&gt; novels), makes a distinction between propositions that are
&gt; claimed to be true of the local real world and propositions
&gt; that aren't. So, for instances, the truthconditions of
&gt; {da gerku}, given that gerku are by definition real (in
&gt; the world in which they gerku), are such that one evaluates
&gt; them by checking through the local real world to see if
&gt; it contains something that has doghood.

The usual interpretation would be:

  da (poi zasti le ma'a munje) cu gerku
  
&gt; Consider English "There is at least one cure for AIDS, and 
&gt; we discussed it". That entails or very very strongly
&gt; implicates that one can go out into the world and find
&gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at least one
&gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure is 
&gt; necessarily real. So the two English sentences seem not 
&gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents are 
&gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We discussed 
&gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how to render 
&gt; in Lojban the English "There is at least one AIDS cure, 
&gt; and we discussed it".

I think somthing like {mi'o casnu su'o lo velmikce be 
fi abu be'o noi ca'a zasti}
 
&gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I 
&gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a
&gt; way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, 
&gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would
&gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that
&gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.

It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri,
but you can do it through predicates that require their
arguments to be in the same world. 

mu'o mi'e xorxes



		
__________________________________ 
Do you Yahoo!? 
The all-new My Yahoo! - What will yours do?
http://my.yahoo.com </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-19 20:40 UTC · Tiki post #3772 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">xorxes:
&gt; --- And:
&gt; &gt; The issue doesn't have to do with referring to only 
&gt; &gt; nonfictional things; it has to do with making it clear
&gt; &gt; what is and isn't claimed to be true of the local real
&gt; &gt; world. Normal discourse, including fictional discourse (e.g.
&gt; &gt; novels), makes a distinction between propositions that are
&gt; &gt; claimed to be true of the local real world and propositions
&gt; &gt; that aren't. So, for instances, the truthconditions of
&gt; &gt; {da gerku}, given that gerku are by definition real (in
&gt; &gt; the world in which they gerku), are such that one evaluates
&gt; &gt; them by checking through the local real world to see if
&gt; &gt; it contains something that has doghood.
&gt; 
&gt; The usual interpretation would be:
&gt; 
&gt;   da (poi zasti le ma'a munje) cu gerku
&gt;   
&gt; &gt; Consider English "There is at least one cure for AIDS, and 
&gt; &gt; we discussed it". That entails or very very strongly
&gt; &gt; implicates that one can go out into the world and find
&gt; &gt; at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at least one
&gt; &gt; cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure is 
&gt; &gt; necessarily real. So the two English sentences seem not 
&gt; &gt; to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents are 
&gt; &gt; synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We discussed 
&gt; &gt; at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how to render 
&gt; &gt; in Lojban the English "There is at least one AIDS cure, 
&gt; &gt; and we discussed it".
&gt; 
&gt; I think somthing like {mi'o casnu su'o lo velmikce be 
&gt; fi abu be'o noi ca'a zasti}

OK, assuming an appropriate definition for {ca'a}. In which
case, {lo ca'a velmikce} ought to be just as good.

&gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I 
&gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a
&gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, 
&gt; &gt; and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would
&gt; &gt; like Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that
&gt; &gt; xorlo happens not to provide it.
&gt; 
&gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri,
&gt; but you can do it through predicates that require their
&gt; arguments to be in the same world. 

Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major
repercussions of xorlo on lojban.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-19 20:40 UTC · Tiki post #3773 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I am
&gt; &gt; &gt; not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a way of
&gt; &gt; &gt; translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and we discussed
&gt; &gt; &gt; it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like Lojban to have a
&gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating it, and that xorlo happens not to provide
&gt; &gt; &gt; it.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you can
&gt; &gt; do it through predicates that require their arguments to be in
&gt; &gt; the same world. 
&gt; 
&gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major
&gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.

Erm.  This has probably been discussed, but is there something wrong
with:

su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le
go'i

-Robin

-- 
http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/
Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!"
Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-19 23:08 UTC · Tiki post #3774 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Robin Lee Powell
&lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:

&gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And
&gt; Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else
&gt; reading this), I am
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; not saying that it is the job of *xorlo*
&gt; to provide a way of
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; translating "There is at least one AIDS
&gt; cure, and we discussed
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it". Rather, I'm saying that one would
&gt; like Lojban to have a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating it, and that xorlo
&gt; happens not to provide
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it
&gt; through gadri, but you can
&gt; &gt; &gt; do it through predicates that require their
&gt; arguments to be in
&gt; &gt; &gt; the same world. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as one
&gt; of the major
&gt; &gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
&gt; 
&gt; Erm.  This has probably been discussed, but is
&gt; there something wrong
&gt; with:
&gt; 
&gt; su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a
&gt; mi'o pu casnu le
&gt; go'i
&gt; 
Well, {su'o pa} looks redundant and so does
{ji'a} but that aside it seems to work, though I
can see where xorxes might object and &amp; as well
(but I think they have crossed some wires). </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-19 23:08 UTC · Tiki post #3776 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">Let's see.  xorxes is right (of course) that
Lojban (nor any language) does not per se
(langage) favor one world over another.  To be
sure, Lojban favors one *kind* of world over
another (I have done both Process philosophy and
Theravada Buddhism in Lojban but it is a real
strain -- and it loses much of its spice since
the basic concepts are so patently abstracted
from the ordinary things that the philosophy
purports to be constructing).  But among the
various possible object-abstraction-setworlds it
does not choose.

The language in use (parole) however does favor
one among the possible worlds. Language is a
social activity which involves shared references
among the conversants.  And the world in which
two conversant are (their "this world" as it
were) is in the beginning the only guaranteed
shared domain of reference.  (This a tad
optimistic since there may be more in one
person's this world than in the other -- consider
a theist and an atheist talking for example [and
notice how often their conversation fails for
this very reason].  But even they share a large
overlapping mass of reality and, as long as they
stick to that, they can converse quite
effectively.)  To move out of this given common
world takes some indicator (not necessarily
linguistic -- sitting on a certain rock in a
certain pose tells everyone that what you are
saying is about Dreamtime, not here-and-now. 
Shifting without flags is at least to be at risk
of being misunderstood and quite likely to be
subject to sanctions -- whatever may be
appropriate ("Don't do that" to murder, say).  

So the way to say that something exists in the
real world is basically to to say it exists and
make sure that no contrary flags are
up.(Actually, when we are off in alternate
worlds, we have explicit devices for getting back
to *this* one -- though I can't remember how that
is lexed at the moment and some clever soul may
have junked it as useless.) To say it exists in
some other world to to make sure the flags are up
and then say it exists.  The same language works
for both (as in the first point) but the context
of use (the more explicit the better, generally)
determines which world it refers to.  
So xorxes is right again at the end -- it is not
a gadri thing, since the gadri all work equally
well in whatever world we are in (and, of course,
the same is true of {ca'a} and the like). </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-20 01:39 UTC · Tiki post #3778 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">Robin:
&gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I am
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a way of
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and we discussed
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like Lojban to have a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating it, and that xorlo happens not to provide
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you can
&gt; &gt; &gt; do it through predicates that require their arguments to be in
&gt; &gt; &gt; the same world. 
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major
&gt; &gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
&gt; 
&gt; Erm.  This has probably been discussed, but is there something wrong
&gt; with:
&gt; 
&gt; su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le
&gt; go'i

The major repercussion is not whether there is a way to say it
(which is an independent issue that could perhaps be discussed in
the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it is no longer the 
meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure". I don't have any objection to 
this, but I think it's important to recognize and record it.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-20 01:39 UTC · Tiki post #3780 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 10:45:39PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that xorlo
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; happens not to provide it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; can do it through predicates that require their arguments to
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; be in the same world. 
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major
&gt; &gt; &gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Erm.  This has probably been discussed, but is there something
&gt; &gt; wrong with:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le
&gt; &gt; go'i
&gt; 
&gt; The major repercussion is not whether there is a way to say it
&gt; (which is an independent issue that could perhaps be discussed in
&gt; the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it is no longer the
&gt; meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure".

It's not?

su'o -cure- == su'o da poi -cure-; I'm not seeing a problem.

-Robin</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-20 01:39 UTC · Tiki post #3781 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:

&gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And
&gt; Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone
&gt; else reading this), I am
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; not saying that it is the job of
&gt; *xorlo* to provide a way of
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; translating "There is at least one AIDS
&gt; cure, and we discussed
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it". Rather, I'm saying that one would
&gt; like Lojban to have a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating it, and that xorlo
&gt; happens not to provide
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it
&gt; through gadri, but you can
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; do it through predicates that require
&gt; their arguments to be in
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; the same world. 
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as one
&gt; of the major
&gt; &gt; &gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; Erm.  This has probably been discussed, but
&gt; is there something wrong
&gt; &gt; with:
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i
&gt; ji'a mi'o pu casnu le
&gt; &gt; go'i
&gt; 
&gt; The major repercussion is not whether there is
&gt; a way to say it
&gt; (which is an independent issue that could
&gt; perhaps be discussed in
&gt; the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it
&gt; is no longer the 
&gt; meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure". I don't
&gt; have any objection to 
&gt; this, but I think it's important to recognize
&gt; and record it.

Well, we could argue about whether it ever was
the meaning of {mi'o casnu su'o --cure---}.  At
some intermediate time between CLL or rather the
gismu list that was then current and now, {mi'o
casnu su'o --cure--} would have been judged
unintelligible, since {casnu2} had to take some
kind of abstract, a topic (probably a proposition
but that was largely open).  This was a
recognition that otherwise the opacity of
{casnu2} would go unmarked and that leads to
problems.  Once that principle got promoted, the
codicil did occur that, if dubious cases were all
covered by abstractions, we could use the simple
form for the cases where the thing talked about
clearly existed here and now.  But that did not
catch on .  And even the fundamental point that
{casnu2} set up an opaque context which should be
marked fell into dissuetude.  Now we have this
curious (incoherent in fact) mixed position: that
{casnu2} is not opaque but that we can use the
simple form without creating problems.  I like
the intermediate position with abstracts but
simples for clearly existing things, but the
original is a possible as is the purely abstracts
strategy.  The current proposal just doesn't
work. </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-21 05:24 UTC · Tiki post #3785 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">Robin:
&gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 10:45:39PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; &gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that xorlo
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; happens not to provide it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; can do it through predicates that require their arguments to
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; be in the same world. 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; Erm.  This has probably been discussed, but is there something
&gt; &gt; &gt; wrong with:
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le
&gt; &gt; &gt; go'i
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; The major repercussion is not whether there is a way to say it
&gt; &gt; (which is an independent issue that could perhaps be discussed in
&gt; &gt; the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it is no longer the
&gt; &gt; meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure".
&gt; 
&gt; It's not?
&gt; 
&gt; su'o -cure- == su'o da poi -cure-; I'm not seeing a problem.

1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure"
2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we discussed it"

These are not synonymous in English, because (2) but not (1) entails
that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and "da ge -cure gi
se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) [*]. Now they mean the
same as (1). So now, to say (2), one would have to say "ca'a cure"
or something along those lines. (I don't consider this a change
for the worse.)

[*] They used to be understood as meaning (2), and that used to be
taken for granted. But this is not to say that a careful reading
of CLL could not be made to show that technically they meant (1),
without anyone having realized it.

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-21 05:24 UTC · Tiki post #3786 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 05:00:45PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; Robin:
&gt; 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure"
&gt;
&gt; 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we discussed it"
&gt; 
&gt; These are not synonymous in English, because (2) but not (1)
&gt; entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and "da ge
&gt; -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) [*]. Now they
&gt; mean the same as (1). 

The hell they do.  su'o -cure- is su'o da poi -cure-, which
absolutely means that a cure exists.  If it doesn't, I'm inclined to
think an error was made somewhere.

-Robin</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''Anonymous · 2005-01-21 05:24 UTC · Tiki post #3787 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">Robin:
&gt; On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 05:00:45PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure"
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we discussed it"
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; These are not synonymous in English, because (2) but not (1)
&gt; &gt; entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and "da ge
&gt; &gt; -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) [*]. Now they
&gt; &gt; mean the same as (1). 
&gt; 
&gt; The hell they do.  su'o -cure- is su'o da poi -cure-, 

yes

&gt; which absolutely means that a cure exists.  

Not in the way that (2) means a cure exists. "su'o da poi -cure"
says that there is at least one thing in the universe of
discourse that in some world is a cure. But the world in which
it is a cure is not necessarily the same world in which it
is discussed; it could be a cure in an imaginary world but
not in the real world in which it is discussed.

&gt; If it doesn't, I'm inclined to think an error was made somewhere.

How so? 

--And.</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-21 05:24 UTC · Tiki post #3788 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- And Rosta &lt;a.rosta@v21.me.uk&gt; wrote:

&gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 10:45:39PM -0000, And
&gt; Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000,
&gt; And Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; To reiterate (for the sake of
&gt; anyone else reading this), I
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; am not saying that it is the job of
&gt; *xorlo* to provide a
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; way of translating "There is at
&gt; least one AIDS cure, and
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; we discussed it". Rather, I'm
&gt; saying that one would like
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Lojban to have a way of translating
&gt; it, and that xorlo
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; happens not to provide it.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; It doesn't provide a way of doing it
&gt; through gadri, but you
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; can do it through predicates that
&gt; require their arguments to
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; be in the same world. 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Fine, but it is as well to note this as
&gt; one of the major
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; Erm.  This has probably been discussed,
&gt; but is there something
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; wrong with:
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti
&gt; .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le
&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; go'i
&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; &gt; The major repercussion is not whether there
&gt; is a way to say it
&gt; &gt; &gt; (which is an independent issue that could
&gt; perhaps be discussed in
&gt; &gt; &gt; the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that
&gt; it is no longer the
&gt; &gt; &gt; meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure".
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; It's not?
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; su'o -cure- == su'o da poi -cure-; I'm not
&gt; seeing a problem.
&gt; 
&gt; 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure"
&gt; 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we
&gt; discussed it"
&gt; 
&gt; These are not synonymous in English, because
&gt; (2) but not (1) entails
&gt; that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and
&gt; "da ge -cure gi
&gt; se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2)
&gt; [*]. 

They still look like 2 to me, since the
quantifier is overtly outside the intensional
context.

Now they mean the
&gt; same as (1). So now, to say (2), one would have
&gt; to say "ca'a cure"
&gt; or something along those lines. (I don't
&gt; consider this a change
&gt; for the worse.)

{ca'a} does not help unless it is always going to
the world of utterance, rather than the current
world, as seems to be the case.

&gt; [*] They used to be understood as meaning (2),
&gt; and that used to be
&gt; taken for granted. But this is not to say that
&gt; a careful reading
&gt; of CLL could not be made to show that
&gt; technically they meant (1),
&gt; without anyone having realized it.
&gt; </div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''pycyn · 2005-01-21 05:24 UTC · Tiki post #3789 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">--- Robin Lee Powell
&lt;rlpowell@digitalkingdom.org&gt; wrote:

&gt; On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 05:00:45PM -0000, And
&gt; Rosta wrote:
&gt; &gt; Robin:
&gt; &gt; 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure"
&gt; &gt;
&gt; &gt; 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we
&gt; discussed it"
&gt; &gt; 
&gt; &gt; These are not synonymous in English, because
&gt; (2) but not (1)
&gt; &gt; entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o
&gt; -cure" and "da ge
&gt; &gt; -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same
&gt; as (2) [*]. Now they
&gt; &gt; mean the same as (1). 
&gt; 
&gt; The hell they do.  su'o -cure- is su'o da poi
&gt; -cure-, which
&gt; absolutely means that a cure exists.  If it
&gt; doesn't, I'm inclined to
&gt; think an error was made somewhere.

Did you miss the move that now makes opaque
contexts unmarked, so that {mi nitcu lo mikce} no
longer means that there is a doctor that I need
and similarly for {casnu2} and the like (it is a
part of xorlo).  Or did you just not notice that
{casnu2} is opaque?</div>

=== xorlo &amp; mi nitcu lo mikce ===
''rlpowell · 2005-01-21 06:25 UTC · Tiki post #3791 (reply to #3487)''
<div style="white-space: pre-wrap">On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:45:17PM -0000, And Rosta wrote:
&gt; Not in the way that (2) means a cure exists. "su'o da poi -cure"
&gt; says that there is at least one thing in the universe of discourse
&gt; that in some world is a cure. But the world in which it is a cure
&gt; is not necessarily the same world in which it is discussed; it
&gt; could be a cure in an imaginary world but not in the real world in
&gt; which it is discussed.

Oh, *that*.

We've been dealing with that since ca'a was invented; I don't see
how xorlo make it any different.

-Robin</div>